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Abstract  
 
Exemption and Limitation Clauses under 
Sudan Law and Comparative Jurisprudence 
  
           Contracts of sale, lease, loan, labour, assignment and 
other types of contracts are the tools whereby different 
transactions are effected whether between individuals inter se 
or among groups of natural or juristic persons. The contents of 
contracts do not rank equally in regard to their legal value. 
Exemption and limitation terms are of the most important 
categories because they delimit the boundaries of the contract. 
Whereas exemption terms enable a party to a contract to 
exclude a liability which will otherwise be his, limitation terms 
limit the liability of a party either by placing a ceiling for 
compensation, or by specifying a time limit for bringing an 
action. They are invariably used in standard form contracts 
particularly in the type known as contracts of adhesion. Now, 
the device of the standard form is a prevalent phenomenon of 
the modern society. It is used in transactions usually associated 
with the needs of the daily life such as electricity, water, 
communication...etc. The providers of these services have 
usually a monopoly on them. Such monopoly is apt to create 
inequality of bargaining powers and to put consumers in a 
weaker position. The law is to step in to restore the contractual 
equilibrium and to protect consumers. This is achieved by 
controlling the use of exemption and limitation terms in 
contracts via statutory or judicial arrangements. The legal 
intervention, whether statutory or judicial, is backed by 
economic and social dimensions. As far as the economic and 
social factors are variable, the need for studying exemption 
and limitation terms is continually renewed not only in 
comparative systems, but also within the same legal system. 
           The vital importance of exemption and limitation terms 
at the legal as well as the economic and social levels always 
triggers studies. This explains why much ink is spilled in 
studying exemption and limitation clauses in most 
jurisdictions. However, there is paucity of literature in Sudan 
particularly at the academic level. The only available elaborate 
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study was made by the late Dr. Zaki Mustafa in 1967. Thence, 
to study this virgin area of Sudan law is to assume a burden at 
once challenging and pioneering. 
         The fact that there is paucity of local literature elevates 
the need for studying exemption and limitation clauses in 
comparative jurisdictions. A comparative handling has a 
twofold value: As a reference for explaining local legal rules 
and as a pointer toward questions yet unsolved in Sudan. It is a 
common goal of all legal systems to guarantee the freedom of 
the parties to agree on their own terms on one hand, and to 
guard against abusive use of contract terms on the other. The 
mechanism for striking a balance between these two 
conflicting demands differs from one system to another. It is 
either legislative or judicial. The degree of the legal 
interference is inversely proportionate to the freedom of the 
parties i.e. less interference means more freedom and vice 
versa.  
          The problem intended to be tackled in this thesis is 
created by the fact that Sudan courts used to follow English 
law from the beginning of the Condominium Period in 1898 
up to 1974. The Contracts Act 1974, due to some local factors, 
had deviated considerably from the pre-existing position which 
was based on English law. The relative  ''illiteracy''  and  
considerations  of  business  ''unawareness''  were  the main 
factors which prompted the Sudanese  legislature to  approach 
the question of exemption and limitation clauses in a different 
way. The rationale of that approach might have been self-
evident at the time the Contracts Act 1974 coming into force. 
However, the same provisions of the Contracts Act 1974 
dealing with exemption and limitation clauses have been re-
enacted and adopted almost verbatim in the present Civil 
Transactions Act 1984. Now, more than three decades have 
elapsed since 1974.The question: What provisions currently 
govern exemption and limitation terms under Sudan law? How 
had Sudan courts applied them? How to deal with matters of 
relatively modern nature such as "standardization" of 
exemption and limitation clauses and ''prevention of unfair 
contract terms'' in ''consumer contracts'' or in other types of 
contracts?  How to make use of comparative jurisprudence as a 
reference for explaining local legal rules and as a pointer 
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toward questions yet unsolved in Sudan?  Is there a need for 
reform? 
These questions sum-up the exact problem posed in this thesis, 
and the answers thereof constitute its main theme.  
          The methodology followed in this thesis is one of 
exposition, comparison, analysis and conclusion. The present 
statement of the law as represented by the Civil Transactions 
Act 1984 is reviewed, analyzed and then compared: Vertically 
with English law and American law, and horizontally with the 
position of Sudan law before 1974 and the period 1974- 1984. 
This creates for grounds for comparison. Notably, the English 
system has been specifically chosen in this thesis because it is 
one of the important historical sources of Sudan law. It was 
applied for more than half a century. The American system, on 
the other hand, is chosen for its closer similarities to the 
Sudanese system, especially in regard to the method of 
preventing the use of abusive exemption and limitation 
clauses. Both systems avail the courts with wide discretionary 
powers to police the use of abusive clauses. 
 
             The thesis consists of five chapters as follows: 
Chapter I:  An introductory chapter consisting of three issues: 
The first tackles the terminology of exemption and limitation 
clauses, the second defines them and the third deals with their 
types and the grounds of their classification. 
 
Chapter II: Discusses the position of Sudan law toward 
exemption and limitation clauses in two issues: The first 
reviews the historical evolution of Sudan law and the second 
analyzes the relevant provisions of the repealed Contracts Act 
1974 and the Civil Transactions Act 1984. 
 
Chapter III:  Revises the experience of comparative systems 
with special reference to the English and the American 
systems. The reason for choosing each of these two systems is 
highlighted as a first issue. The second issue studies English 
law with reference to certain heads and the third deals with 
American law specifically the doctrine of contractual 
conscionability. 
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Chapter IV:  Deals with three issues related to exemption and 
limitation clauses. The first is the rules of interpretation of 
exemption and limitation clauses and the application of such 
rules, the second is the phenomenon of standard form contracts 
and contracts of adhesion under local and comparative 
jurisprudence and the third is the effect of a fundamental 
breach on the applicability of an exemption or a limitation 
clause in the same contract. 
 
Chapter V:  A closing chapter to sum-up the results to which 
this study has reached coupled with the specific 
recommendations. The chapter is appended with two 
schedules: The first comprises three lists of judicial precedents 
which are discussed or referred to from the Sudanese, English 
and American systems. The second comprises a list of 
references, text books and articles quoted or referred to in this 
thesis. 
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 ﺑﺴﻢ ﺍﷲ ﺍﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ ﺍﻟﺮﺣﻴﻢ
 
  ﻤﺴﺘﺨﻠﺹ
  ﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺤﺩ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻨﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﻘﺎﺭﻥ 
  
ﻤﻥ ﺒﻴﻊ ﻭ ﺍﺠﺎﺭﻩ ﻭﻗﺭﺽ ﻭ ﻜﻔﺎﻟﻪ ﻭﻋﻤل ﻭﺤﻭﺍﻟﻪ ﻭﻤﺎ ﺴﻭﺍﻫﺎ ﻤـﻥ         ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻭﺩ 
ﻤﺴﻤﺎﻩ ﻭﻏﻴﺭ ﻤﺴﻤﺎﻩ ﻫﻲ ﺍﻻﺩﺍﺓ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﺨﺩﻤﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻤﻌﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﻤﻼﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺘﻡ ﺒﻴﻥ  ﻋﻘﻭﺩ
ﻭﺩﺭﺍﺴـﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻘـﻭﺩ .  ﻜـﺎﻨﻭﺍ ﺍﻡ ﺍﻋﺘﺒـﺎﺭﻴﻴﻥ ﺍﻻﻓﺭﺍﺩ ﻭﺍﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﺸﺨﺎﺼﺎﹰ ﻁﺒﻴﻌﻴﻴﻥ 
ﺘﺴﺘﻭﺠﺏ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺎﻡ ﺍﻻﻭل ﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﻤﺸﺘﻤﻼﺘﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻤﺜﻠﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺸﺭﻭﻁﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻫﻤﻬﺎ 
ﻭﺘﺄﺘﻲ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺔ ﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﻫﺫﺍ .  ﻤﻭﻀﻭﻉ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺙ ﺒﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺤﺩ ﻤﺎ ﻴﻌﺭﻑ 
ﺍﻟﻨﻭﻉ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺸﺭﻭﻁ  ﻟﺩﻭﺭﻫﺎ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﺴﻡ ﻓﻲ ﺘﺭﺴﻴﻡ ﺤﺩﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﺩ ﻭﻓﻲ ﺘﻘﺭﻴﺭ ﻤـﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ 
ﻓﺒﻤﻭﺠﺏ ﺸﺭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻴﺘﻤﻜﻥ ﺍﺤﺩ ﺍﻻﻁـﺭﺍﻑ ، ﺸﺌﻪ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻻﺨﻼل ﺒﻪ ﺍﻻﻁﺭﺍﻑ ﺍﻟﻨﺎ 
 ﺍﻤﺎ ﺸﺭﻁ ﺍﻟﺤﺩ ﻓﻴﻤﻜﻥ ﺍﻁﺭﺍﻑ ﺍﻟﻌﻘـﺩ ﻤـﻥ ﺘﻘﻴﻴـﺩ ،ﻤﻥ ﺍﺴﺘﺒﻌﺎﺩ ﺍﻟﺘﺯﺍﻡ ﻤﻘﺭﺭ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ 
ﻓﺎﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻴﺭﺩ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﻨﺠﻡ ﻋﻥ ﺍﺨﻼل . ﺍﻻﻟﺘﺯﺍﻡ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺎﻗﺩﻱ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻨﺤﻭ ﻤﺎ 
ﺒﻴﻨﻤـﺎ ﻴـﺭﺩ ، ﻴﻪ ﺘﻤﺎﻤﺎﹰ ﺍﺤﺩ ﺍﻻﻁﺭﺍﻑ ﺒﺎﻟﺘﺯﺍﻡ ﺍﻨﺸﺄﻩ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﺩ ﻭﻴﺘﺤﻘﻕ ﺒﺎﺴﺘﺒﻌﺎﺩ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟ 
ﺍﻭ ، ﺍﻟﺤﺩ ﺍﻤﺎ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻤﻘﺩﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﻭﻴﺽ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﺠﺏ ﺩﻓﻌﻪ ﻟﻠﻁﺭﻑ ﺍﻟﻤﻀﺭﻭﺭ ﻟﺠﺒﺭ ﺍﻟﻀﺭﺭ 
ﻋﻠﻲ ﺘﺤﺩﻴﺩ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻱ ﺍﻟﺯﻤﻨﻲ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻴﺠﻭﺯ ﺨﻼﻟﻪ ﻟﻠﻁﺭﻑ ﺍﻟﻤﻀﺭﻭﺭ ﻤﻁﺎﻟﺒﺔ ﺍﻟﻁـﺭﻑ 
ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﻬﺎﻡ ﻟﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺤﺩ ﻴﺠﻌل ﻤﻨﻬﺎ ﻫﺩﻓﺎﹰ ﺩﺍﺌﻤﺎﹰ  .ﺍﻻﺨﺭ ﺒﺎﻟﺘﻌﻭﻴﺽ 
ﻴﺔ ﺩﺭﺍﺴﺘﻬﺎ ﺍﻴﻀﺎﹰ ﻜﺜﺭﺓ ﻭﺭﻭﺩﻫﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﻨﻤﻭﺫﺠﻴﻪ ﻭﻤﻤﺎ ﻴﺯﻴﺩ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻫﻤ ، ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺴﻪ
 ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺍﺼﺒﺤﺕ ﻅﺎﻫﺭﻩ ﻋﺎﻤﻪ ﻤﻀﻁﺭﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺘﻁﻭﺭ ﺍﻻﺫﻋﺎﻥﻭﺒﺎﻟﺫﺍﺕ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻴﻌﺭﻑ ﺒﻌﻘﻭﺩ 
ﻓﻌﻘﻭﺩ ﺍﻻﺫﻋﺎﻥ ﺘﺴﺘﺨﺩﻡ ﺍﻟﻴﻭﻡ ﻓﻲ ﻤﻌﻅـﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﻌـﺎﻤﻼﺕ ﺍﻟﺘـﻲ ، ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﺼﺭ ﺍﻟﺤﺩﻴﺙ 
ﺘﺭﺘﺒﻁ ﺒﺤﺎﺠﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﺍﻟﻴﻭﻤﻴﻪ ﻤﺜل ﺨﺩﻤﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻜﻬﺭﺒﺎﺀ ﻭ ﺍﻟﻤﻴﺎﻩ ﻭ ﺍﻟﻨﻘل ﻭﺍﻟﻬـﺎﺘﻑ 
ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻨﻭﻉ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺨﺩﻤﺎﺕ ﻋﺎﺩﺓﹰ ﺘﺤﺘﻜﺭ ﺘﻘﺩﻴﻤﻪ ﺠﻬﺎﺕ ﻤﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻭﻟﺫﻟﻙ ﻴﺘـﺩﺨل . ﻭﻏﻴﺭﻫﺎ
ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﻤﻥ ﺤﻴﻥ ﻻﺨﺭ ﻟﺘﻨﻅﻴﻤﻬﺎ ﺒﻐﺭﺽ ﺘﺤﻘﻴﻕ ﺍﻟﺘﻭﺍﺯﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺎﻗﺩﻱ ﺒﻴﻥ ﺍﻻﻁـﺭﺍﻑ 
ﻭﻤﻥ ﻫﻨـﺎ ﻴﺒـﺭﺯ ﺍﻟﺒﻌـﺩ ، ﻭﻟﻀﻤﺎﻥ ﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﻬﻠﻙ ﺒﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭﻩ ﺍﻟﻁﺭﻑ ﺍﻻﻀﻌﻑ 
ﺕ ﺍﻟﻅـﺭﻭﻑ ﻭﻟﻤـﺎ ﻜﺎﻨ  ـ. ﺍﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ﻭ ﺍﻻﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻟﻬﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻨﻭﻉ ﻤـﻥ ﺍﻟـﺸﺭﻭﻁ 
ﺍﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻴﻪ ﻭ ﺍﻻﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﻪ ﻤﺘﻐﻴﺭﻩ ﻭ ﻤﺘﻔﺎﻭﺘﻪ ﻟﻴﺱ ﻓﻘﻁ ﺒﻴﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﻪ ﻭﺍﻨﻤـﺎ 
X 
ﻓﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﺠﻪ ﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﻫﺫﻩ ، ﺤﺘﻲ ﺩﺍﺨل ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﺤﺩ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﺘﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺭﻴﺨﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﻪ 
  . ﺍﻟﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺘﺘﺠﺩﺩ ﺒﺎﺴﺘﻤﺭﺍﺭ
ﻤﺎﹰ        ﺍﻫﺘﻤﺕ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﻪ ﻋﻤﻭﻤﺎﹰ ﺒﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺤﺩ ﻓﺼﺎﺭﺕ ﻫﺩﻓﺎﹰ ﺩﺍﺌ 
ﻟﻠﺒﺎﺤﺜﻴﻥ ﻴﺘﻨﺎﻭﻟﻭﻨﻬﺎ ﺒﺎﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﻪ ﺒﻐﺭﺽ ﻀﻤﺎﻥ ﺤﺴﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﻁﺒﻴﻕ ﻭ ﻟﺘﻁﻭﻴﺭﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ 
 ﺒﺨﻼﻑ ﻤﺎ ﻗﺩﻤﻪ ﺍﻟﻤﺭﺤﻭﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻜﺘﻭﺭ ﺫﻜـﻲ —ﻟﻼﺴﻑ—ﻟﻜﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻥ ، ﺘﺤﻜﻤﻬﺎ
ﻤﺼﻁﻔﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻭﺍﺨﺭ ﺴﺘﻴﻨﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﺎﻀﻲ ﻻ ﺘﺘﻭﻓﺭ ﺍﻱ ﺩﺭﺍﺴﻪ ﻤﻔﺼﻠﻪ ﺘﻌـﺎﻟﺞ 
ﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺎﻗﺩﻴﻪ ﺒﺎﻟﺭﻏﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﻭﻗﻑ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻲ ﻤﻥ ﻤﺴﺎﻟﺔ ﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺤﺩ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟ 
ﻭ ﻟﻬـﺫﺍ ﺍﻟـﺴﺒﺏ ﻓـﺎﻥ ، ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﻁﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﻜﺒﻴﺭﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺤﺩﺙ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻤﺴﺘﻭﻱ ﺍﻟﺘـﺸﺭﻴﻌﺎﺕ 
  .ﺩﺭﺍﺴﺘﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻀﻭﺀ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻨﻲ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻟﻲ ﺘﺸﻜل ﺴﺒﻘﺎﹰ ﻭﺘﺤﺩﻴﺎﹰ
        ﻤﻥ ﻨﺎﺤﻴﻪ ﺍﺨﺭﻱ ﻓﺎﻥ ﻨﺩﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻤﺎﺩﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﻠﻴﻪ ﺘﹸﻌﻠﻲ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺔ ﺩﺭﺍﺴـﺔ ﻫـﺫﻩ 
ﺭﺽ ﺍﺴﺘﺼﺤﺎﺏ ﺘﺠﺎﺭﺒﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﻭﻗﻭﻑ ﻋﻠـﻲ ﺍﻟﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺎﺭﻨﻪ ﺒﻐ 
ﺤﻠﻭل ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺎﺌل ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻟﻡ ﺘﺤﺴﻡ ﺒﻌﺩ ﺒﻭﺍﺴﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻨﻲ ﻭﺒﻐﺭﺽ ﺘﻭﻓﻴﺭ ﻤﺎﺩﻩ 
ﻓﺎﻟﻨﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﻪ ﺠﻤﻴﻌﺎ ﺘﺭﻤـﻲ ﻟﺘﺤﻘﻴـﻕ . ﻟﺸﺭﺡ ﻭﻤﻘﺎﺒﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﻠﻴﻪ 
ﻫﺩﻑ ﻭﺍﺤﺩ ﻫﻭ ﻀﻤﺎﻥ ﺤﺭﻴﺔ ﺍﻻﻁﺭﺍﻑ ﻓﻲ ﻭﻀﻊ ﺸﺭﻭﻁﻬﻡ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺎﻗﺩﻴـﻪ ﺒﺎﻨﻔـﺴﻬﻡ 
ﺤﺭﻴـﺔ ﻭﺘﺤﻘﻴﻕ ﺍﻟﺘـﻭﺍﺯﻥ ﺒـﻴﻥ ، ﻲ ﺍﺴﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﺘﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﺤﺭﻴﻪ ﻭﻟﻜﻥ ﻓﻲ ﻏﻴﺭ ﺘﻌﺴﻑ ﻓ 
ﺍﺴـﺒﺨﺩﺍﻡ  ﻓﻲ ﻭ ﻤﻨﻊ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺴﻑ ﻤﻥ ﻨﺎﺤﻴﻪ ﺍﻻﻁﺭﺍﻑ ﻓﻲ ﻭﻀﻊ ﺸﺭﻭﻁﻬﻡ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺎﻗﺩﻴﻪ 
، ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺤﻴﻪ ﺍﻻﺨﺭﻱ ﻫﻭ ﻤﺤﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﺨﻼﻑ ﺒﻴﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﻪ ﺘﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﺤﺭﻴﻪ  
ﻓﺎﺩﻭﺍﺕ ﺘﺤﻘﻴﻕ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﺩﻟﻪ ﻓـﻲ ﺒﻌـﺽ ، ﻭﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺠﻪ  ﻭﻫﻭ ﺨﻼﻑ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﺩﻭﺍﺕ 
 ﻫﻲ ﻗﻭﺍﻨﻴﻥ ﻭ ﻟﻭﺍﺌﺢ ﻴﺘﺩﺨل ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺭﻉ ﻤﻥ ﺤﻴﻥ ﻻﺨﺭ ﻟﻴﺴﻨﻬﺎ ﻭ ﺒﻌﺽ ﺍﻟـﻨﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﻡ
ﺘﺭﻜﺕ ﺍﻤﺭ ﻤﻌﺎﻟﺠﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺴﻑ ﻓﻲ ﺍﺴـﺘﺨﺩﺍﻡ ﺸـﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔـﺎﺀ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺤـﺩ  ﻟﻠﺘﻘـﺩﻴﺭ 
 ﺘﺘﻨﺎﺴـﺏ — ﻜﺎﻥ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺍﻟﺘﺩﺨل ﻗـﻀﺎﺌﻲ ﺍﻡ ﺘـﺸﺭﻴﻌﻲ —ﺩﺭﺠﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﺩﺨل . ﺍﻟﻘﻀﺎﺌﻲ
ﻓﺤﻴﺜﻤﺎ ﻗـل ﺘـﺩﺨل ﺍﻟﻤـﺸﺭﻉ ، ﻋﻜﺴﻴﺎ ﻤﻊ ﺍﻟﻘﺩﺭ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺎﺡ ﻤﻥ ﺤﺭﻴﻪ ﻻﻁﺭﺍﻑ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﺩ 
ﻫـﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺠﺎﻨـﺏ . ﻟﻤﺤﺎﻜﻡ ﺍﺘﺴﻌﺕ ﺤﺭﻴﺔ ﺍﻻﻁﺭﺍﻑ ﻓﻲ ﻭﻀﻊ ﺸﺭﻭﻁﻬﻡ ﻭﺒﺎﻟﻌﻜﺱ ﻭﺍ
ﻴﺒﺭﺯ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺔ ﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﻨﺼﻭﺹ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﺭﻴﻌﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺎﺭﻨـﻪ ﻭﻤﺎﺘـﺴﺘﺒﻁﻨﻪ ﺘﻠـﻙ 
ﻜﻤﺎ ﻴﺒﺭﺯ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺔ ﺍﺴﺘﻌﺭﺍﺽ ﻭﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻁﺒﻴﻘﺎﺕ ، ﺍﻟﻨﺼﻭﺹ ﻤﻥ ﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎﺕ ﻭﻤﻘﺎﺼﺩ 
  . ﺍﻟﻘﻀﺎﺌﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺘﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﻡ
ﻲ ﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﻅـﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻘـﺎﻨﻭﻨﻲ ﻓـﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻴﻁﺭﺤﻬﺎﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺙ ﺘﺘﻠﺨﺹ ﻓ ﺍﻟﻤﺸﻜﻠﻪ       
ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻥ ﺴﺎﺭ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻨﻬﺞ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﺍﻻﻨﺠﻠﻴﺯﻱ ﻤﻨﺫ ﺒﺩﺍﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺤﻜـﻡ ﺍﻟﺜﻨـﺎﺌﻲ ﻓـﻲ 
IX 
 ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻓـﺎﺭﻕ 4791 ﺘﺎﺭﻴﺦ ﺴﺭﻴﺎﻥ ﻗﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻭﺩ ﻟﺴﻨﺔ  4791ﻭ ﺤﺘﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ 8981
 4791ﺭﺒﻤﺎ ﻜﺎﻥ ﻟﻠﺘﻐﻴﻴﺭﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺤﺩﺙ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ . ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻻﻨﺠﻠﻴﺯﻱ ﻓﻲ ﺠﻭﺍﻨﺏ ﻫﺎﻤﻪ 
ﺎﻟﻤﺸﺭﻉ ﺍﻥ ﻴﺎﺨﺫ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭﺒﺒﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﻅﺭﻭﻑ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻤﺒﺭﺭﺍﹰ ﺍﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺎﹰ ﺤﺩﻱ ﺒ 
ﺘﺨﺘﻠﻑ  ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻥ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻨﺠﻠﺘﺭﺍ ﻭ ﺘﺤﺩﻴﺩﺍ ﺍﺭﺘﻔﺎﻉ ﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﺍﻻﻤﻴﻪ ﻭ ﺍﻨﺨﻔـﺎﺽ 
ﺍﻻﻥ ﻭﻓﻲ ﻅل ﺍﺤﻜﺎﻡ ﻗﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﻌـﺎﻤﻼﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻴـﻪ . ﻤﺴﺘﻭﻱ ﺍﻟﻭﻋﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﺠﺎﺭﻱ ﻭﻗﺘﺌﺫ 
ﻤﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺍﻟﻨـﺼﻭﺹ : 4791 ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺍﻋﺎﺩ ﺍﺼﺩﺍﺭ ﻨﺼﻭﺹ ﺴﻠﻔﻪ ﻗﺎﻨﻭﻥ 4891 ﻟﺴﻨﺔ
ﺒﻌﺩ ﻤﻀﻲ ﻭ  ﺘﺤﻜﻡ ﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺤﺩ ؟ ﻜﻴﻑ ﻁﺒﻘﺘﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﺎﻜﻡ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻨﻴﻪ؟ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ
ﻫل ﻻ ﺯﺍﻟﺕ ﺍﻻﺴﺎﻨﻴﺩ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ : ﻴﺄﺘﻲ ﺍﻟﺴﺅﺍل 4791ﻤﺎﻴﺯﻴﺩ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺜﻼﺜﻪ ﻋﻘﻭﺩ ﻤﻨﺫ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ 
 ﻤﻥ ﺒﻌﺩﻩ ﺼﺎﻟﺤﻪ ﻟﺘﺒﺭﺭ ﺍﻻﺒﻘـﺎﺀ ﻋﻠـﻲ 4891 ﺜﻡ ﻗﺎﻨﻭﻥ 4791ﺒﻨﻲ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻗﺎﻨﻭﻥ 
ﻭﻀﻊ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟـﻨﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴـﻪ ﺍﻟﻭﻀﻊ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﻫﻥ ﺍﻡ ﻫﻨﺎﻙ ﺤﺎﺠﻪ ﻟﻤﺭﺍﺠﻌﺘﻪ ؟ ﻤﺎ ﻫﻭ ﺍﻟ 
ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺎﺭﻨﻪ؟ ﻜﻴﻑ ﺘﹲﻁﺒﻕ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺭﻴﻪ ﺍﻻﻥ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺒﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﺩﺜﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺍﻓﺭﺯﺘﻬـﺎ 
 ﺍﻟﺘﺠﺭﺒﻪ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻨﻴﻪ ﻤﺜل ﻨﻤﺫﺠﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻭﺩ ﻭ ﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﻬﻠﻙ ﻭ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻤﻨـﻊ ﺍﻟﺘﻌـﺴﻑ 
ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺎﻗﺩﻴﻪ؟ ﺘﻠﻙ ﻫﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺸﻜﻠﻪ ﺍﻟﺘـﻲ  ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﻪ ﻤﻥ  ﺍﻟﺤﺩ ﻋﻨﺩ ﺍﺸﺘﺭﺍﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻭﻋﻨﺩ 
  . ﻤﻭﻀﻭﻋﻪﻭﺍﻻﺠﺎﺒﻪ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻻﺴﺌﻠﻪ ﺘﺸﻜل ﻴﻁﺭﺤﻬﺎ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺙ 
ﻓﻘﺩ ﺍﺨﺫ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺙ ﺒﻤﻨﻬﺞ ﻴﺘﻠﺨﺹ ﻓﻲ ﻁﺭﺡ ﺍﻟﻤـﺴﺎﻟﻪ ، ﺍﻻﺴﻠﻭﺏ      ﻤﻥ ﺤﻴﺙ 
،  ( 4891ﻗـﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﻌـﺎﻤﻼﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻴـﻪ )ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻀﻭﺀ ﻤﺎﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻌﻤل ﺍﻻﻥ 
 ﺒﻤﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ  ﺭﺍﺴﻴﺎ ﻭ، ﺍﻻﻤﺭﻴﻜﻰ ﻭ ﺍﻻﻨﺠﻠﻴﺯﻱ ﺒﺎﻟﻨﻅﺎﻤﻴﻥ ﺍﻓﻘﻴﺎ: ﺜﻡ ﻤﻘﺎﺭﻨﺘﻬﺎ ، ﻓﺘﺤﻠﻴﻠﻬﺎ
(  4891 -4791)ﻭ ﺍﻟﻔﺘـﺭﻩ ( 4791)ﻗﺒـل  ﻤﺎ:  ل ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻥ ﺨﻼل ﻓﺘﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﻤ
ﻭﻗـﺩ ﺠـﺎﺀ . ﻭﺒﺎﻟﻨﺘﻴﺠﻪ ﺘﺘﻭﻓﺭ ﺍﺭﺒﻌﻪ ﻨﻅﻡ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎﺭﻨﻪ ﻤﻊ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻤﻭل  ﺒﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟـﺴﻭﺩﺍﻥ 
ﺍﺨﺘﻴﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻻﻨﺠﻠﻴﺯﻱ ﺒﺴﺒﺏ ﺍﻨﻪ ﺍﺤﺩ ﺍﻫﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺼﺎﺩﺭ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺭﻴﺨﻴﻪ ﻟﻘـﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﻘـﻭﺩ 
 ﻭﺍﺴﺘﻤﺭ ﺤﺘﻲ ﺒﻌـﺩ 8981ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻨﻲ ﺤﻴﺙ ﻜﺎﻥ ﻤﻁﺒﻘﺎﹰ ﻤﻨﺫ ﺒﺩﺍﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺤﻜﻡ ﺍﻟﺜﻨﺎﺌﻲ ﻓﻲ 
ﺍﻤﺎ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻻﻤﺭﻴﻜﻲ ﻓﻘﺩ ﺘﻡ ﺍﺨﺘﻴﺎﺭﻩ ﻟﺘـﺸﺎﺒﻬﻪ . 4791ﺍﻋﻼﻥ ﺍﻻﺴﺘﻘﻼل ﻭﺍﻟﻲ ﺴﻨﺔ 
ﻤﻊ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻨﻲ ﻤﻥ ﺤﻴﺙ ﺍﻟﻭﺴﺎﺌل ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺒﻌﻪ ﻟﻤﻨﻊ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺴﻑ ﻓﻲ ﺍﺴﺘﺨﺩﺍﻡ ﺸـﺭﻭﻁ 
ﺍﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺤﺩ ﻭﻻﺘﻔﺎﻕ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻤﻴﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﻭﻴل ﺍﻟﻜﺒﻴﺭﻋﻠﻲ ﺍﻟﻭﺴـﺎﺌل ﺍﻟﻘـﻀﺎﺌﻴﻪ ﺍﺫ 
ﻴﻬﻤﺎ ﺒﺴﻠﻁﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﺴﻌﻪ ﺘﻤﺎﺭﺴﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻤﺤﺎﺭﺒﺔ  ﺍﺴﺘﺨﺩﺍﻡ ﺍﻟﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺘﺘﻤﺘﻊ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﺎﻜﻡ ﻓﻲ ﻜﻠ 
  .  ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺴﻔﻴﻪ
 : ﻓﺎﻥ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺙ ﻴﻘﻊ ﻓﻲ ﺨﻤﺴﻪ ﻓﺼﻭلﺍﻟﻤﺸﺘﻤﻼﺕ       ﺍﻤﺎ ﻤﻥ ﻤﻥ ﺤﻴﺙ 
IIX 
ﺍﻻﻭل ﻋﺎﻟﺞ ﻤﺼﻁﻠﺢ ﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔـﺎﺀ ﻭﺍﻟﺤـﺩ ، ﻭﻓﻴﻪ ﺜﻼﺜﻪ ﻤﺒﺎﺤﺙ ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﺍﻻﻭل 
ﺎﺴﺏ ﻟﻬﺫﻩ ﻭﻋﺭﺽ ﻤﺎ ﻫﻭ ﻤﺴﺘﺨﺩﻡ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﻪ ﺜﻡ ﺍﺨﺘﺎﺭ ﻤﺎ ﻫﻭ ﻤﻨ 
ﻭ ﺍﻟﻤﺒﺤﺙ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻨﻲ ﺍﻭﺭﺩ ﺘﻌﺭﻴﻔﺎﹰ ﻟﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺤﺩ ﻭ ﺍﻟﻤﺒﺤﺙ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻟﺙ ، ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﻪ
  . ﺍﺴﺘﻌﺭﺽ ﺍﻨﻭﺍﻋﻬﺎ ﻭ ﺍﺴﺱ ﺘﺼﻨﻴﻔﻬﺎ
ﺘﺎﺭﻴﺨﻴﻪ ﻟﺨﺼﺕ ﺘﻌﺎﻤـل  ﺍﻻﻭل ﺘﻀﻤﻥ ﺨﻠﻔﻴﻪ ،  ﺍﺸﺘﻤل ﻋﻠﻲ ﻤﺒﺤﺜﻴﻥ ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻨﻲ 
ﺍﻟﻤﺒﺤﺙ . ﻭﺍﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﻴﻭﻡ 4791ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻨﻲ ﻤﻊ ﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻭﺍﻟﺤﺩ ﻤﻨﺫ ﻤﺎﻗﺒل 
ﺜﺎﻨﻲ ﺍﺴﺘﻌﺭﺽ  ﺍﻟﻨﺼﻭﺹ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺤﻜﻡ ﺸـﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔـﺎﺀ ﻭﺍﻟﺤـﺩ ﻓـﻲ ﻗـﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟ
 ﺍﻟﻤﻠﻐـﻲ 4791 ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻟﻲ ﻭ ﻗـﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﻘـﻭﺩ ﻟـﺴﻨﺔ 4891ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﻤﻼﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻴﻪ ﻟﺴﻨﺔ 
ﺍﻴﻀﺎﹰ ﺍﺸﺘﻤل ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻤﺒﺤـﺙ ﻋﻠـﻲ . 4791ﻭﻤﻘﺎﺭﻨﺘﻬﻤﺎ ﻤﻊ ﻤﺎﻜﺎﻥ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻌﻤل ﻗﺒل 
  .ﺒﻌﺽ ﺍﻻﺤﻜﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﻀﺎﺌﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﻪ ﺒﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺤﺩ
ﺒﻴﻥ ﻜﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺘﻌﺎﻤل ﺍﻟﻨﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺎﺭﻨﻪ ﻤﻊ ﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺤﺩ  ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻟﺙ 
، ﺍﻟﻤﺒﺤﺙ ﺍﻻﻭل ﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻻﻨﺠﻠﻴﺯﻱ ﺒﺎﻟﺘﺭﻜﻴﺯ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻤﺴﺎﺌل ﻤﺤﺩﺩﻩ ، ﻓﻲ ﻤﺒﺤﺜﻴﻥ 
ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺒﺤﺙ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻨﻲ ﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﻤﻨﻬﺞ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻻﻤﺭﻴﻜﻲ ﻟﻤﻨﻊ ﺍﻟﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺴﻔﻴﻪ ﻭﻤﺎ ﻴﻌـﺭﻑ 
  . ﺒﻤﺒﺩﺃ ﻤﻌﻘﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺭﻭﻁ
ﺌل ﺫﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺼﻠﻪ ﺒﺸﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺤﺩ ﻭﻭﻗـﻑ ﻋﻠـﻲ  ﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺎ ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺒﻊ 
ﺍﻟﻤﺒﺤﺙ ﺍﻻﻭل ﻋﺭﺽ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺘﻔـﺴﻴﺭ ﺸـﺭﻭﻁ ﺍﻻﻋﻔـﺎﺀ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺤـﺩ ﻭ : ﺜﻼﺜﻪ ﻤﻨﻬﺎ 
ﻭﺍﻟﺜﺎﻨﻲ ﻨﺎﻗﺵ  ﻅﺎﻫﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﻨﻤﻭﺫﺠﻴﻪ ﻭ ﻋﻘﻭﺩ ﺍﻻﺫﻋـﺎﻥ ، ﺘﻁﺒﻴﻘﺎﺕ ﺘﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ 
ﺍﻟﻤﺒﺤﺙ . ﻭﻤﻨﻬﺞ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻨﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﻘﺎﺭﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺎﻤل ﻤﻌﻬﻤﺎ  ﻨﺼﻭﺼﺎﹰ ﻭﺘﻁﺒﻴﻘﺎﹰ 
ﺎﻟﺙ ﻨﺎﻗﺵ ﺍﺨﻼل ﺍﺤﺩ ﺍﻁﺭﺍﻑ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﺩ ﺒﺸﺭﻁ ﺠﻭﻫﺭﻱ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻭ ﺍﺜﺭ ﺫﻟـﻙ ﺍﻻﺨـﻼل ﺍﻟﺜ
  .ﻋﻠﻲ ﺴﺭﻴﺎﻥ ﺍﻱ ﺸﺭﻁ ﺍﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﺍﻭ ﺤﺩ
 ﺨﺎﺘﻤﻪ ﻟﻠﺒﺤﺙ ﻟﺨﺼﺕ ﺍﻟﻨﺘﺎﺌﺞ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺍﻨﺘﻬﻲ ﺍﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﻭﻗﺩﻤﺕ ﻤﻘﺘﺭﺤﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﺍﻟﺨﺎﻤﺱ 
ﺜﻡ ﺍﻭﺭﺩﺕ ﻤﻠﺤﻘﺎﹰ ﺍﺸﺘﻤل ﺒﺩﻭﺭﻩ ، ﻤﺤﺩﺩﻩ ﻟﻤﺭﺍﺠﻌﺔ ﻤﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻌﻤل ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻥ ﺍﻻﻥ 
ﻗﺎﺌﻤـﻪ ﻟﻠـﺴﻭﺍﺒﻕ :  ﺍﻻﻭل ﺜﻼﺜﻪ ﻗﻭﺍﺌﻡ ﻟﻠﺴﻭﺍﺒﻕ ﺍﻟﻘـﻀﺎﺌﻴﻪ ﺒﺎﻟﺠﺩﻭل، ﻋﻠﻲ ﺠﺩﻭﻟﻴﻥ 
ﻭﺒﺎﻟﺠﺩﻭل ﺍﻟﺜـﺎﻨﻲ ﻗﺎﺌﻤـﻪ ﻭﺍﺤـﺩﻩ ، ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻨﻴﻪ ﻭﺜﺎﻨﻴﻪ ﻟﻼﻨﺠﻠﻴﺯﻴﻪ ﻭﺜﺎﻟﺜﻪ ﻟﻼﻤﺭﻴﻜﻴﻪ 
  .ﻟﻠﻤﺭﺍﺠﻊ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﻠﻴﻪ ﻭﺍﻻﺠﻨﺒﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ُﺃﻗﺘﹸﺒﺱ ﻤﻨﻬﺎ ﺍﻭ ُﺃﺸﻴﺭ ﻟﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﻪ
  
   
 Chapter I 
Introduction 
Terminology – Definition – Classification 
(1)Terminology 
 
         The expressions: "exemption’’, ‘‘exception’’ and 
‘‘exclusion’’ clauses are used interchangeably in commercial law 
parlance. The Contracts Act 1974, referred to ‘‘exemption'' 
clauses.1In an informal translation of the Civil Transactions Act 
1984 (C.T.A.1984), the same expression was used.2 Late 
Professor Z. Mustafa in a seminal article published in 1967 used 
‘‘exemption clauses’’ as a title.3 Moreover, ‘‘exemption clauses’’ 
was the expression used by Sudan courts in the few cases   
reported   in   the   subject.4 
        English jurisprudence, on the other hand, has recognized the 
three versions. Thus, while Coote 5 dealing with "exception" 
clauses, both D.Yates 6 and R. Lawson 7 referred to "exclusion" 
clauses. Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston referred to both 
"exclusion" and "exemption" clauses indiscriminately.8However, 
the expression "limitation" is universally agreed upon. Though 
the two expressions: "exemption" and "limitation" are an 
inseparable blend, yet, they are not synonymous.   
       In this study the expression, ‘‘exemption clauses” is 
preferred as a matter of convenience.  Reference to ‘‘limitation 
clauses’’ will be made where the context so requires. 
                                                 
1-  Section (52) 
2 - Unpublished work, Ministry of Justice Sudan, Drafting and 
Translation Department Archive. 
3-  Zaki Mustafa, The Treatment of Exemption Clauses by The Sudan 
Courts, Journal of Africa Law, 1967, p112.  
4- EL Rashid Hamza Koko v. Kamal Khalafalla,(1965), S.L.J.R, Taha 
Mohammad El Rofaei V. Provident Ass. Of Egypt.(1969) S.L.J.R 
5-  Coote Exception Clauses (1964) 
6- David Yate's Exclusion Clauses in Contracts, reprinted 1979, Sweet 
and Maxwell. 
7-  Richard Lawson, Exclusion Clauses After the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act, 1st, ed 1979 
8- Cheshire ,Fifoot, and Furmston Law of Contract, 14th. ed. , 
Butterworth, P. 171 
 (2) Definition 
 
              In legal theory, "exemption" and "limitation" terms 
are defined as: 
 "Terms included in a contract that exclude or limit or purport 
to exclude or limit liability that would otherwise arise"9.  
             It   is   clear   from the definition   that   both 
"exemption" and   "limitation"   terms   work   in a common 
field viz.  the   liability   of   the   parties   and ;   that    the   
difference   between  them  is  mainly  one  of  degree:  
Whereas  "exemption"   terms   are  used   for   full  exclusion   
of   liability, "limitation"   terms   are  used, inter alia, for  
partial  exclusion  of  liability. The expression "limitation"  is 
also referred in order to  place  a  ceiling  liability or  a  period 
of   time  within  which  an  action  for  damages   must   be   
brought . 
            Neither the C.T.A. 1984 nor its predecessor the 
Contracts Act 1974 defined "exemption" or "limitation" 
clauses, however, their relevant provisions are in line with the 
definition referred to above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 - J.C.Smith& J.A.C.Thomas, a Casebook on Contract, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 9th. Ed., P.444 
 (3)Types of Exemption and Limitation Clauses 
     
              "Exemption" and "Limitation" clauses are categorized 
by academic lawyers on different grounds: Sometimes on 
ground of  "form"  into "procedural"  and "substantive",  other 
on  ground of  "Source"  into  "statutory"  and "contractual" 
exemption clauses. However, the most interesting  
classification  is  based  on  "function":  What  is  the function  
of  a  particular  "exemption"  or  "limitation"  clause?  
 
 
(a)-Classification as to Form: 
 
"Procedural" exemption or limitation clauses are –generally 
speaking—those which create a time limit within which an 
action must be brought under the contract, e.g. 
"The Second Party must initiate proceedings within one week 
after declaration of the end of amicable settlement. The 
distinction is always blurred between exemption and limitation 
clauses in this area. In the above example, the same clause 
limits time within which an action must be brought. It does 
also exempt the First Party from liability in an action brought 
beyond that week. 
 On the other hand, "substantive" exemption and limitation 
clauses are clauses that exempt one party from liability in 
regard to certain kinds of damage, e.g. 
"The First Party is under no liability to compensate the Second 
Party against death or bodily injury caused by any employee 
of the First Party.    
 
(b)Classification as to Source:  
 
    According to this classification, exemption and limitation 
clauses are either contractual or statutory. Contractual 
exemption and limitation clauses are those which are created 
by the consensual agreement of the parties. They are the 
commonest category. Whereas statutory exemption and 
limitation clauses are clauses embodied in any piece of 
legislation and the parties' written instrument incorporates 
them by reference or they are read into the contract by force of 
 law. The relevant piece of legislation may be a statute, 
regulations or an international convention. Example is Sudan 
Railways Regulations (currently 1999)10. The Warsaw 
Convention is another example. Originally signed in 1929 in 
Warsaw (hence the name). It was amended in 1955 in The 
Hague and in 1975 in Montreal. This convention is replaced by 
the Montreal Convention of 1999. Sudan signed it on 
28\5\1999; however, it has not been ratified in Sudan so far. 
The convention governs and regulates limitation of liability of 
air carriers for death or bodily injury, for loss of or damage to 
baggage, and for delay. Tickets' provisions issued by the 
different airlines regularly incorporate them. The ticket issued 
by Sudan Airways Corporation incorporates the limitation 
clauses provided for by the convention in the same way as 
other air companies do.11 
 
 
 
 
(c)- Classification as to Function: 
 
            According to the functional classification, "exemption" 
and "Limitation" clauses are categorized as follows: 
 
****   True exemption clauses:  
The clauses recognize a potential breach of contract, and then 
excuse liability for the breach. 
****   Limitation Clauses: 
  The clauses place a limit on the amount that can be claimed 
for breach of contract, regardless of the actual loss. 
 **** Time limitation Clause: 
     The clause states that an action for a claim must be 
commenced within a certain period.  
 
                                                 
10 -Infra footnotes: 64, 65, 66, 68 
11 -The Lufthansa ,the KLM, the Royal Jordanian….etc are examples    
 Chapter II 
 
Exemption and Limitation Clauses under Sudan 
Law 
 
Historical Background—Exemption and Limitation Clauses 
under the Contracts Act1974  
and C.T.A1984 
 
 
(1) Historical Background 
 
        In his analysis to the Sudanese legal system, Dr. Salman 
M. A.  Salman concluded   that it is "Characterized by 
pluralism". 12 One of the manifestations of that "pluralism" is 
the multiplicity of sources from which it derives. Thus, in less 
than  a  century: (1898–1984) , the  three  major  systems ever  
known all over the  world in the field of contract law, were  
inspired  and  tested  in  Sudan. These are: English common 
law, Egyptian French-based (Continental) law   and   Islamic 
law. 
     At the dawn of the Condominium period that began in 
1898, the new administrators passed the Civil Justice 
Ordinance 1900. Section (9) introduced for the first time, the 
famous formula: "justice, equity and good conscience". That 
formula had represented all which was enacted by way of rules 
of substantive civil justice in Sudan. It was re-enacted by the 
C.J.O. 1929, section (9).13 The provision: "justice, equity and 
good conscience" was said to be imported from India. 14 
    The reception of English law in Sudan via the vehicle : 
"Justice, equity and good conscience" had assumed different 
shapes ranging from inspiring English rules; to application of 
general principles; to application of English judicial decisions 
                                                 
12 -Salman M. Ahmad  Salman, The Sudan Legal System, Unpublished 
Paper, U.of k.,  Faculty of Law , 1980 
13 - The succeeding Civil Proc. Acts of 1974 and 1983 have adopted the 
same provision.   
14 -   Z. Mustafa, infra note 15, at P.57, referring to E.G Guttmann. 
 and eventually, to passing of English-based statutes.15 A 
number of statutes some of which are still in force were 
passed. Examples are the present Companies Act 1925, the 
Bankruptcy Act 1928, and the Bills of Exchange Act 1917. 
       After the declaration of independence in 1956, no radical 
change was made. The process of application and adaptation 
of English law was going on. According to Z. Mustafa: 
 "This period was largely a continuation of the period 
preceding it. It is true that this period may have had some 
characteristics of its own, but it is also true that there was no 
radical change whether as regards the philosophy or the 
pattern adopted". 16               
        The experience of English law in the Sudan was, and still 
is, the subject matter of considerable debate. One group 
advocates it, another opposes it and a third stands in a twilight 
zone. Whatever the stance from the experience of English law 
in the Sudan might have been, it was an important episode in 
the evolution of the legal history of the Sudan. According to 
the late Galal Ali Lutfi, judge of the Supreme Court (as he then 
was): 
 "There is nothing wrong with the way followed in receiving 
and applying English law in the Sudan ''.  17 
      Following the popular up-rising of October 1964, the 
National Charter was drawn up. It provided in Article (9) that;  
 "There shall be formed a law revision committee for the 
purpose of proposing new laws consistent with our traditions''. 
A Law Commission was formed in 1966 for fulfilling the 
requirements of the National Charter. However, it was 
dissolved in 1968 and was replaced by five Law Commissions 
created and governed by The Law Commissions Act 1968. 
   In 1969, the government repealed the Law Commissions Act 
1968 and consequently dissolved the five commissions set up 
under it at a time when some of those commissions had gone a 
                                                 
15 - For full account of the reception of English law in Sudan see:  Z. 
Mustafa, The Common Law in the Sudan, Oxford, 1971, a doctoral thesis 
presented to the University of London.  
16 -Ibid, at P. 181 
17 -Galal Ali Lutfi, ''The Future of the English Law in the Sudan'' , 
(1967), S.L.J.R.219 
 
 long way towards accomplishing their task. The orientation 
was directed towards a system of law similar to that in force in 
the Arab countries particularly Egypt, being the sponsor of the 
Arab Nationalism Movement which was at its peak at that 
time. The Civil Code 1971 was intended to legislate the 
substantive civil law of the Sudan. It was based mainly on 
Egyptian legislation. It was a drastic shift to the other extreme. 
However, no soon than 1973, the Civil Code 1971 was 
abolished and the pre-existing position was restored 
provisionally. The then Attorney General appointed a number 
of Law Commissions .Their work crystallized in the 
legislations of 1974. It was one of the most important episodes 
in the evolution of Sudan law. Chief among the 1974 
legislations were The Penal Code, Code of Criminal 
Procedure, The Sale of Goods Act, The Agency Act, and The 
Contracts Act 1974, with which we are concerned in this 
study. 
     In 1983, the so-called "prompt justice program" was 
launched in Sudan. Its declared objective was the 
implementation of Islamic law. In the course of that 
"program" a number of statutes were passed. The C.T.A.1984 
was one of them. It was first promulgated as Provisional Order 
No.(6) in February 1984 and finally passed by the legislature 
in March of the same year. It has abolished the Contracts Act 
1974. Dr.  Mohamed El Sheikh Omar traces the source and 
criticizes the provisions of the 1984 Act as follows: 
 "It was passed in a hurry, no legal institution participated  in  
preparing it,  it is a hybrid,  an isolated,  a shaky  and  an  
inconsistent  instrument  in  many  respects"18  
        Regarding its source, the same writer said:  
 "Almost 70% of the provisions of the C.T.A.1984 were derived 
from the Civil Code 1971. The rest was imported mainly from 
Jordanian law and to a lesser degree from Libyan law" 19  
        In the field of "exemption'' and ''limitation'' clauses, the 
C.T.A.1984 has made no drastic change. It has almost re-
enacted its predecessor. Despite the fact that the C.T.A.1984 is 
in force for more than two decades, the judicial literature on it 
                                                 
18 -  Dr. Mohamed El Sheikh Omar, The Civil Transactions Act 1984, 
(1988), S.L.J.R, an article in Arabic 
19 - Ibid. 
 is at dearth. It is the same paucity of local literature which led 
Professor Z. Mustafa to say: 
    '' A Person writing  about the  law of the Sudan would from 
the very start develop an unmistakable feeling that he is a 
pioneer exploring uncharted seas of knowledge and 
unearthing fresh information with every step he takes in his 
research .The legal system offers rich and seemingly endless 
treasures for the eager and keen scholar, but one soon come to 
realize that any worthwhile research on the law of the Sudan 
entails searching archives for long forgotten or very badly 
classified documents and reading hundreds of unreported 
cases, and exerting oneself in different ways to make sure that 
nothing has been missed and that whatever is written is amply  
supported by authority and practice." 20  
 
                                                 
20-  Supra note 15,  the Preface 
 ( 2) Exemption and Limitation Clauses under the 
Contracts 
Act 1974 and the C.T.A.1984 
         
Both Sections (120)(1) of the C.T.A.1984 and (52)(1) of the 
repealed Contracts  Act 1974  Provide:     
      "The parties may agree to exempt either of them from 
liability or to limit such liability in the cases specified in the 
contract provided that an exemption or limitation term shall 
not be effective unless the party benefiting from the term gives 
the other party sufficient notice of the existence of such term 
before the conclusion of the contract". 
  
(I) " The parties' freedom to exempt either of them from 
liability or to limit liability: 
 
       The opening words of the section emphasize the right of 
the parties to agree on their own terms. This is obvious from 
the word "may" and its discretionary implication. This "right" 
derives from the doctrine of "freedom of contract".  According 
to Nicolas Wilson, "freedom of contract has two distinct 
meanings, first, the freedom to enter into agreements, and 
second, the freedom from interference with a contract once 
made". 21 
       The same writer in tracing the origins of the doctrine of 
freedom of contract concluded that its first formal 
manifestation was the United States Constitution Art (1) 
section (10). He alleged that it reappeared shortly afterwards in 
the revolutionary and Napoleonic legislation of   France.22  
      It is submitted that the doctrine of freedom of contract has 
roots in Islamic jurisprudence centuries before the 
promulgation of the American Constitution and the 
Napoleonic legislations. Both Quran and Sunna alluded to it.             
 
 
                                                 
21 - Nicolas S. Wilson, Freedom of Contract and  Adhesion Contracts 
I.C.L.Q, 14: 172-193 
22 - Ibid. 
  ﻲﻟﺎﻌﺗ لﺎﻗ :  
 )  ﺮѧﻴﻏ ﻢﻜﻴѧﻠﻋ ﻲﻠﺘﻳﺎѧﻣ ﻻإ مﺎѧﻌﻧﻻا ﺔѧﻤﻴﻬﺑ ﻢѧﻜﻟ ﺖѧﻠﺣأ دﻮﻘﻌﻟﺎѧﺑ اﻮѧﻓوأ اﻮﻨﻣأ ﻦﻳﺬﻟا ﺎﻬﻳأ ﺎﻳ
 ﺪﻳﺮﻳ ﺎﻣ ﻢﻜﺤﻳ ﷲا نإ مﺮﺣ ﻢﺘﻧأو ﺪﻴﺼﻟا ﻲﻠﺤﻣ ( ﻢﻴﻈﻌﻟا ﷲا قﺪﺻ . ﻩﺪﺋﺎﻤﻟا)1 (  
     Further authorities can also be inferred from other Quranic 
verses.23 From Suna, the Haddith narrated by Jabir bin 
Abdullah: "Their Conditions are those which are mutually 
agreed upon by them", 24  is a solid ground in supporting the 
recognition of the doctrine of freedom of contract by Sharia.  
   The concept of "freedom of contract" is an ideologically 
charged notion. Its "rise" 25 was associated in Europe with the 
prevalence of the concept of "laissez faire"26 which in its turn 
associated with individualism and the utilitarian conceptions 
sponsored by Bentham and Mills27. With the retreat of the 
concept of "laissez faire" as an economic paradigm, the ever-
increasing criticism to the absolute recognition of the doctrine 
and the subsiding of individualism, the doctrine of "freedom of 
contracts" and its derivatives retreated accordingly. Writers 
then began to refer to the "fall" 28 of   the doctrine of freedom 
of contracts. 
    Commenting on the reluctance of the English courts to 
interfere or to adjust the contracts terms, Ramadan Ali 
Mohamed J., wrote: 29                   
  '' The problem raised by this new approach is that the courts 
must strike a balance between the freedom of contract, on the 
one hand, and the weak contractual position of an individual 
dealing with a monopoly or company, on the other". 
                                                 
23 - -Alanaam152, Alisraa 34, Alnahl 91, Almaarij 32,  Albagara 27&177, 
Altoba 1 
24 -Sahih Al-Bukhari, Arabic-English, Vol.lll, P574, by Dr. Mohammad 
Muhsin Khan, Islamic University, Al-Medina ElMunawara  
25 -  P.S. Attiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract.  
26 -  French phrase literally meaning, "Let do" or “allow to do". As a 
principle, it is about the theory that the economy works best if private 
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         In American jurisprudence, the relevant dicta are that of 
Chief Justice Hughes in Morehead v. People of State of New 
York:  
      ''We had frequent occasions to consider the limitations on 
liberty of contract. While it is highly important to preserve that 
liberty from arbitrary and capricious interference,  it is also 
necessary to prevent its abuse , as otherwise it could be used 
to override all public interests and thus in the end destroy the 
very freedom of opportunity which it is designed to safeguard" 
30    
      The restrictions and limitations increasingly imposed on 
the doctrine of freedom of contract had paved the way for its  
"fall". Legislative interference and judicial control are the 
main mechanisms for that imposition. ''Consumer protection'' 
is the main goal for the sake of which freedom of contract is 
heavily restricted. Each jurisdiction has the method of its own 
in restricting or controlling the oppressive use or abuse of 
exemption and limitation clauses. The C.T.A 1984 has 
provided for extensive requirements all tend to control or to 
restrict the use of exemption clauses as referred to bellow. In 
England, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 has been 
supplemented by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 for achieving the same goal. Other 
jurisdictions have mechanisms though not dissimilar to the 
Sudanese, they differ as to the scope and sometimes as to the 
pattern in respect of the way such jurisdictions restrict the 
freedom of the parties to a contract and their will. 
      The C.T.A.1984, following its predecessor the Contracts 
Act 1974, has adopted a compromising approach. On one  
hand,  it  gives the  parties  to a contract the discretion to 
exempt  either  of  them from  liability  or  to  limit  that  
liability i.e. it acknowledges the doctrine of freedom  of  
contract. The general principle is laid down in section (112) 
that: "a contract is the law of its parties". The opening words 
of section (120) specifically provide for the parties' discretion 
"to exempt either of them from liability or to limit that 
liability". On the other hand, it has encompassed that 
"discretion" with far-reaching restrictions provided for in 
section (120) (4), detailed analysis of which will be made later.  
                                                 
30 -  298. U.S. 587 at P. 627 
  
 
 (ii) "In the cases specified in the contract" 
 
       Terms of a contract including an "exemption" or a 
"limitation" clause are frequently printed in a document 
tendered or delivered by one party to another. They may also 
be displayed about the premises where the contract is to be 
made. Scarcely such terms are made orally. Whatever form 
such terms including the clause may take, a basic requirement 
is to be satisfied: The instrument including the clause must be 
Contractual in nature. The clause must constitute part of the 
contract. In England, the statement of  Cheshire 31 which was 
approved  by Lord  Denning  M. R. that : "The Court must be 
satisfied that the particular document relied on as containing 
notice of the excluding or limiting term is in truth an integral 
part of the contract". 
  According to Cheshire," it must have been intended as a 
contractual document and not as a mere acknowledgement of 
payment".  He  added, "to hold a party bound by the terms of a 
document which reasonable persons would assume to be no 
more than a receipt is an affront to common sense".   
In the case of Chapelton V.  Barry UDC 32 
 
   The defendant council kept a pile of deckchairs on their 
beach. The plaintiff hired two deck chairs from the defendant. 
The chairs were stacked near a notice which read ….."Hire of 
chairs 2d per session of 3 hours" and which requested the 
public to obtain tickets from the chairs attendant and retain 
them for inspection. The plaintiff took the chairs and obtained 
two tickets from the attendant, which he put in his pocket 
without reading it. When he sat on one of the chairs, it 
collapsed and he was injured. He sued the council who relied 
on a provision printed on the ticket excluding liability for any 
damage arising from the hire of a chair. The Court of Appeal 
held the defendant liable on the ground that the notice on the 
beach constituted the offer, which the plaintiff accepted when 
he took the chair, and the notice contained no statement 
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 limiting the liability of the council, that no reasonable man 
would assume that the ticket was anything but a receipt for the 
money, that the defendant had failed to satisfy the preliminary 
requirement of identifying the ticket as a contractual 
document. 
 
 (III) Methods of Incorporating Exemption Clauses 
 
          There are four ways whereby an "exemption" or a 
"limitation" clause can be incorporated into a contract namely: 
"incorporation by notice", "incorporation by signature", 
"incorporation by custom" and "incorporation by previous 
cause of dealings". 
(a)Incorporation by Notice 
 
     According to section (120) of the C.T.A.1984, an 
exemption or a limitation clause "shall not be effective unless 
the party benefiting from the term gives the other party 
sufficient notice of the existence of such term". 
    The first requirement imposed by the section is the giving of 
notice by the party benefiting from the term to the other party. 
The notice required by the section is not a mere notice. It must 
be "sufficient". The question of "sufficiency of notice" was, 
and still is, the subject of considerable debate. In England, the 
division of view as to what is meant by "sufficient notice" was 
reduced to two main perspectives: One is subjective and the 
other is objective. 
   According  to  the  subjective  perspective,  it  must  be  
proved  that  the party  saw, read and understood  the 
significance of the exemption clause. The  objective  
perspective,  on  the  other  hand,  is  less onerous  on  the  
party  benefiting  from  the  clause. Notice is deemed  
"sufficient"  if  it  is  proved  that  the other  party  has an  
opportunity  to  read  the exemption  clause. Whether or not 
that party had actually read the clause is immaterial.     
    The distinction between the two perspectives is not a mere 
theoretical abstraction. It  has  a  crucial  bearing  on  the  
applicability  of  an  exemption  or  a  limitation  clause  and 
consequently,  on  the  outcome  of  the  decision  which  may  
be  reached  at  by  a  court  of  law. 
     Sudan Courts, before 1974 dealt with the question of 
sufficiency of notice objectively.  Ramadan Ali Mohamed J., 
quoting with approval Anson's statement, declared: 
      " The test is highly objective and the fact that the 
particular plaintiff is under some non-legal disability, for 
example, that he cannot speak  English, or is blind, or 
illiterate, is quite immaterial, provided that  the  notice is 
reasonably sufficient for the class of persons to which he 
belongs''.33 
   Whether or not the attitude of Sudan Courts has now 
changed is not clear. However, it  is  submitted  that  the 
import  of the relevant provisions  of both  the  Contracts Act 
1974,   and  the  C.T.A.1984  are   irreconcilable  with  an  
objective  attitude. Under  these Acts,  the  party  benefiting  
from  the  clause  has  much  to  do if  a  notice  is  to  be 
considered ''sufficient''. This is obvious from the wide 
exceptions recognized by both Acts to the rule that dispenses 
with notice in signed documents.   
 The following cases reflect the attitude of English courts to 
the question of sufficiency of notice:  
 
 (1) Interfoto Picture Library v Stiletto Ltd  34  
    The defendants, an advertising agency, ordered 47 
photographic transparencies from the plaintiff operators of a 
photo library. The transparencies were accompanied by a 
delivery note which contained a number of conditions. 
Condition (2) provided that a holding fee of ₤5 per day was 
payable in respect of each transparency retained after 14 days. 
The defendants did not return the transparencies on time and 
the plaintiffs sued for the holding fee payable under Condition 
(2) which amounted to ₤3785.The Court of Appeal held that 
Condition (2) had not been incorporated into the contract. 
Interfoto had not taken reasonable steps to bring such an 
unusual, unreasonable and onerous term to Stiletto's notice. 
The plaintiffs were awarded ₤3.50 per transparency per week 
on a quantum merit basis.   
                                                 
33 -  Supra note 29. 
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 (2)  Spurling v Bradshaw  35 
  The defendant delivered eight barrels of orange juice to the 
plaintiffs who were warehousemen. A few days later the 
defendant received a document from the plaintiff which 
acknowledged receipt of the barrels. It also contained a clause 
exempting the plaintiffs from liability for loss or damage 
"occasioned by the negligence, wrongful act or default" caused 
by themselves, their employees or agents. When the defendant 
collected the barrels some were empty, and some contained 
dirty water. He refused to pay the storage charges and was 
sued by the plaintiffs.  It was held that although the defendants 
did not receive the document containing the exclusion clause 
until after the conclusion of the contract, the clause had been 
incorporated into the contract as a result of a regular course of 
dealings between the parties over the years. The defendant had 
received similar documents on previous occasions and he was 
now bound by the terms contained in them. 
 
Timing of Notice 
      The ''notice ''  required  by  law  to  be  given  by  the  
party  seeking  the  protection  of  an  ''exemption''  or   a  
''limitation''  clause  must  be  given  ''before  the  conclusion  
of the contract''.  A belated notice is valueless. The leading 
English case in this respect is: 
 
Olley V. Marlborough Court LTD 36 
 A husband  and  wife  arrived at a  hotel  as  guests and paid  
for  a week's  board  and  residence. They  went  up  to  the 
bedroom allotted  to them, and  on one  of  its  walls  was a  
notice  that  '' the proprietors will not hold themselves 
responsible for articles lost or stolen unless handed to the 
manageress for safe custody.'' The  wife  then  closed  the self-
locking  door  of  the  bedroom, went  downstairs  and  hung  
the  key on  the  board  in   the  reception  office. In  her  
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 absence  the key was  wrongfully  taken  by  a  third  party , 
who  opened  the  bedroom  door  and  stole  her   furs.    
    The defendants pleaded the   exemption clause. Singleton 
and Denning LJJ. considered   that   the   contract  was  
completed   before   the   guests   went   to   their  room.  
Defendants' plea was rejected.   
 The  question  of   '' timing  of  notice''   has  never   came  up  
before  a  Sudanese  court. Unfortunately, it has to be dealt 
with in a hypothetical way.    
             The  legend  typically  stated  inside Sudanese  buses  
that  ''Luggage  inside  the bus  is at  its  owner's  risk.''  Taken  
as  a  case-study , the   following   factual  situations  can  be  
conceived :  
 
 (1) A passenger purchases a ticket at an office ''before'' 
entering into the bus. The  ticket  contains  no  reference  to  
any  notice  or  a  clause  therein.  
             It  can be  argued, in  favour  of  the  passenger, that  
the  contract  was concluded  at the  office. The notice inside 
the bus is a belated one. The clause is not effectively 
incorporated. The   requirement  that  the  notice  must  be  
given   ''before the conclusion of the contract'', has  not  been   
satisfied .The  passenger  is  not  bound  by  the  clause.     
 
(2) Assuming  that  the  same clause  was  written  at  a  
conspicuous place at the tickets office .The conclusion would 
have been different . There is ample room for arguing in 
favour of the owner of the bus. The  passenger  will  be  bound  
by  the  clause  unless  ''illiteracy''   is  proved .  
 
(3) If the passenger is a regular user of the  same bus , the  
position  will  be  different  even  if  no  notice  is  stated   at  
the   tickets  office  nor  on  the  ticket  itself. However, the 
passenger's illiteracy   is, again, a good defence.    
 (B)   Incorporation by Signature 
  
            In considering the question of "notice" a distinction is 
drawn between "oral" and "written" contracts. In "oral" 
contracts the party benefiting from the term must give 
"sufficient notice" to the other party.  
           In "written" contracts a further distinction is drawn 
between "signed" and "unsigned" documents. 
        In "unsigned" documents the position is almost equated 
with "oral" contracts: Again, the party benefiting from the 
term must give the other party "sufficient notice" of the 
existence of that term.                     
     In  both  cases: "oral" and "unsigned" contracts, whether or 
not "sufficient notice"  has  been given is a question of  fact 
depending on  the  merits of  the  particular  case. 
           The third category is "signed" documents. According to 
section (120)(2) of the C.T.A.1984, 
 
'' An exemption or limitation term shall be effective even 
though the party benefiting from it has not given the other 
party notice of its existence if the term is contained in a 
document forming part of a contract which has been signed by 
the other party whether by writing his signature or by affixing 
his seal or thumbprint on it''.  
         In England, the statement of the law was expounded by 
Mellish, L J. in:  Parker V. S.E. Railways Co.37  
'' Where an action is brought on a written agreement which is 
signed by the defendant , the agreement is proved by proving 
his signature , and , in  the  absence  of  fraud ,  it  is  wholly  
immaterial  that  he  has  not  read the agreement and does not 
know its contents''. 
The leading case of L'Estrange V. Graucob 38 , 
 
provides 
clarity to the law by attaching central importance to a party’s 
signature as an act evincing an intention to be bound by a 
contract. In that case, a buyer of an automatic slot machine 
signed a written document which contained a clause that 
provided that “any express or implied condition, statement, or 
warranty, statutory or otherwise not stated herein is hereby 
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 excluded.”  The buyer did not read the document or this clause 
and accordingly knew nothing of its contents. There was no 
evidence of misrepresentation by the vendor which induced 
the buyer either as to the terms of the contract or to sign it. The 
machine did not work satisfactorily and the buyer brought an 
action for damages for breach of an implied warranty that the 
machine was fit for the purpose for which it was sold.  
At first instance, judgement was given for the plaintiff buyer 
on the ground that although she knew that there was writing on 
the document she signed, she did not know that the writing 
contained conditions relating to the terms of the contract and 
the defendants had not done what was reasonably sufficient to 
give her notice of those conditions. The court depended on the 
decision in Richardson, Spence & Co v Rowntree39. 
However, on appeal It was held that the buyer was bound by 
the contract and it was “wholly immaterial” that she had not 
read it or did not know its terms. Scrutton LJ held that 
Richardson, Spence & Co v Rowntree was a “railway 
passenger and cloak-room ticket case”
 
and as such, the present 
case was distinguishable from it. He decided that the case was 
instead governed by the principle stated by Mellish LJ in 
Parker v South Eastern Ry Co
 
and was distinguishable in 
general terms from ticket cases where there is no signature.
 
He 
said that in cases where there is a written but unsigned 
document, “it is necessary to prove that an alleged party was 
aware, or ought to have been aware, of its terms and 
conditions” but “these cases have no application when the 
document has been signed.” The principle was stated in the 
dicta of Scrutton L.J. as follows:  
   "When a document containing contractual terms is signed, 
then in  the absence  of  fraud  or,  I will  add,  
misrepresentation , the  party  signing  it  is bound, and it is 
wholly immaterial whether he has read the document or not''. 
  Blackburn J. expounding the logic behind binding a person to 
the terms of a written contract which he had signed in his 
statement in:   Harris V. Great Western Railway, where he 
stated:40  
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  ''By assenting to the contract thus reduced to writing, he 
represents to the other side that he has made himself 
acquainted with the contents of that writing and assents to 
them, and so induces the other side to act upon that 
representation by entering into the contract with him, and is 
consequently precluded from denying that he did make himself 
acquainted with  those  terms .'' 
  Following English law, Sudan law reached to the same 
conclusion in a number of cases decided before 1974. Thus, it 
was   held by Peacock J. in: Negib Huddad V. Cotonoficio 
Veneto & Yousif Hakim,41 that:  ''It was the business of the 
purchasers to get the contract independently explained to them 
before they signed.'' 
     In that case, one of the issues was  whether a clause in a 
contract written  in English  and  signed  by a  person  who 
does not  know  English  binds  such  a person. The answer 
was positive.        
        Less than ten years later, the same issue again came up 
for decision   before Khartoum High Court in: Sasso Bracale 
and Co. V. Mohamed Ahmad Abdel Magid 42, and  Halford 
J. reiterated  the same  rule.                     
       After the declaration of independence, the position 
remained the same .Thus, in: Engineering Co ltd  V .Ahmad 
Fadl el Mula & Another.43 
              A hire-purchase contract concluded between  the 
plaintiff and  the defendants was  written  in  English .The 
defendants who, did not know English  at all , were asked to 
sign it and they did .The  contract  contained  a  clause  which  
stated  that :                                                                                      
              "The hirer has examined the said diesel engine and 
accessories previous to this agreement and satisfied 
themselves as to the state and condition thereof and no 
warranty on the part of the owners as to the state or quality is 
implied other than the standard form warranty issued by the 
makers of the diesel engine.''          
            When sued for failure to pay the installments, they 
pleaded that they were never given a chance to examine the 
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 engine before delivery, and that after delivery they discovered 
that the engine was defective and that certain parts were 
missing. They further disclaimed the exemption clause on the 
ground that it was written in a language unknown to them. 
            The District Judge held that the signature of a contract 
written in English by persons   who do not know English is not 
binding on them. 
        When the case went on revision to the Court of Appeal, 
that view was seriously questioned by Babiker Awadalla J.(as 
he then was ), who stated : 
''If  a  person wants to avoid  the  consequences  of  a written  
agreement  on  the  grounds  of ( non est  factum)    then  it  is  
for him   to  plead  that  fact , otherwise  he will  be bound  by 
his  signature''.      
             The Honorable Judge, having become the Chief 
Justice , took the  opportunity  again  to deal  with  the  same  
issue  in : Sudan Mercantile co. (Motors) LTD. V. Abdel 
Karim  Beshir Mustafa & Others.44  
            The defendant signed a hire-purchase agreement for the 
purchase of a diesel tractor which contained the following 
clause: 
''The hirer has examined (or caused to be examined) the said 
vehicle and accessories previous to this agreement, and 
satisfied himself as to the state and condition thereof, and no 
warranty on the part of the owners as to the state or quality 
thereof is implied, or as to their fitness for any purpose; any 
warranty as to quality and fitness and road worthiness being 
hereby excluded.''  
           The defendant defaulted in the payment of the 
installment and when sued alleged that the tractor is not fit for 
the purpose for which he wanted it and counter-claimed a sum 
of Ls. 1396, being losses incurred by him as a result of the 
unfitness of the tractor .The defendants further alleged that 
they were not bound by the exemption clause because it was 
printed in English , a language they could not read . 
          The Honorable Chief Justice - in dealing with the 
question of signature of documents containing exemption 
clauses - stated the  law  as  follows : 
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          ''It is high time that people who voluntarily enter into 
contracts in the normal course of business should realize that 
they do so at their own risk and peril. If it ultimately turns out 
that the contract-which is apparently in solemn form and is 
obviously meant to include conditions touching the subject 
matter of the contract-does in fact contain conditions 
restricting the rights of the parties in any way , then that party 
would be held bound by his own signature .''45            
        In line with that approach, Mubarak Imam El Hag J. in 
another case stated:       
  ''A party signing a written contract is bound by all the terms 
contained therein, whether he has read them or not, unless 
there was some fraud or misrepresentation which induced him 
to sign without reading a  document which he would not have 
signed had he been aware of all the terms''.  46 
       It is now clear that Sudan Courts were consistent in their  
approach  to  the  point throughout  the Colonial  Period and  
even  after  independence   up  to 1974 . 
        In 1974, the Contracts Act 1974 came into force. That 
Act  recognized  the  same approach with regard to the binding 
effect of terms included in a written document signed or sealed  
by  the other party , (S.52(1)  . In principle, It was consonant 
with the pre-existing position in this respect.  A party is, 
generally, bound by the terms of what he signed. This is also 
the position under the present C.T.A.1984. However, these two 
Acts recognized major exceptions thereby introducing drastic 
departure from the pre-existing position and English law as 
discussed bellow.  
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 Exceptions to the Rule 
 
        The rigorous application  of the rule that a party who  
affixes  his  signature or seal  to  a  written  document  is 
bound  by  the  contents  of  that document  whether  he read it 
or not , was severely  criticized. The statement of late 
Professor Z. Mustafa that: 
        ''It thus appears that the Sudan Courts have, for the last 
50 years, been fairly consistent in their approach to the 
problem under discussion. But unfortunately it was a 
consistency in departure from the principles of justice, equity 
and good conscience and in misreading the relevant principles 
of English law .'' 47  He further stated : 
           ''In their attempt to administer 'justice equity and good 
conscience' our courts have allowed themselves to be used as 
instruments of inequity and injustice.''   He resorted to 
American law to justify his conviction. Referring to a decision 
of a New Jersey Supreme Court48, he added:    
''The court refused to recognize that there is a hard-and-fast 
rule of law which  says that once a person signs a written 
contractual document he is automatically bound by the 
contents thereof , whether he read it or not ,whether he 
understood it or not and whether he was capable of reading it 
or not.''   
           So, it was not a haphazard coincidence  that the same 
opposing  writer  was  the  Attorney General of  Sudan when  
the  Contracts Act 1974 came  into  force  implementing  his  
views. The step introduced by the Act had gone even further 
than his proposal .He was of opinion that there was no need for 
a statutory intervention, and that the courts can evolve their 
own rules to protect illiterate persons. 49 However, the 
legislative intervention imposing some statutory restrictions 
was ultimately recognized thereby introducing a step further 
than the proposal of Professor Zaki.  
          Sections  (52) (2)  of   the  Contracts  Act  1974 ,   
120(2)  of  the C.T.A.1984 , recognize   three  cases   under 
any of them  the  effect  of  signature  is  defused  and    the   
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 original   requirement  of  notice  to  be  given  by  the  party  
benefiting   from the term is thereby revived. These are: (a) 
Illiteracy (b) Foreign language (c) Obliterated terms.   
 
 
(i) Illiteracy 
 
 
          The  exception provided  for in  section  (120)(2)(a)  of  
the  C.T.A.1984  and  section (52)(2)(a) of the repealed 
Contracts Act 1974, is applicable  to cases ''where the party 
who signed is  illiterate.''  According to this exception, 
illiteracy negatives the effect of signature, seal or thumbprint 
as dispensations with notice.    
          In more than one place in this study, it is emphasized  
that  the statutory exception based  on  ''illiteracy''  might  
have  been  justified  up to 1984. However , the  validity of  
that  justification  after  more than  three  decades  since  the 
first appearance  of  the exceptions in 1974 , is now 
questionable has it remained as it is. The following grounds 
are in support   of this view:                  
 
(I)  Illiteracy is a misfortune,  not a  privilege;  it is a disgrace 
to be  bothered by reading  illiteracy  in a  world  striving  for  
computer  literacy. 
 
(ii) It  is  neither  advisable  nor  is it  sensible to have two  sets 
of legal rules one for the literates  and the other for  the  
illiterates. 
 
 (iii)  The very grounds on which the provision of section 
(52)(2) (a) were  primarily  based , are  no longer valid i.e. The 
socio-economic conditions prevailing in 1974 are not 
necessarily the   same   nowadays.50 
 
(iv)The  interest of  the  party  benefiting  from  the  term 
should  also  be  upheld. Although  it is a  good  policy  to 
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 protect the interest of the  weakest  party , it  is  a  bad  policy  
to inflate  that  protection  and , as a result , reverse  the 
contractual   equilibrium to the other extreme instead of 
maintaining a balance.  
          Building on these grounds, this study advocates the view 
that recognizes  the ''illiteracy''  of  the  signing  party  as  an  
exceptional factor  apt to shift the  burden  of  explaining  the  
terms  to  the  party   benefiting   from  them ,  PROVIDED 
THAT : The party benefiting  from the terms has knowledge of 
the other party's  illiteracy .This view is not a legal  novelty . It 
has ample support, at least in English   jurisprudence   both 
academic and judicial. 
          According to R. Lawson , ''It appears , however , that 
where  the  special  disability  is  known  to  the other party , 
that will  suffice  to  disapply  the  particular  clauses,''.51  
In support, he referred to the case of: Geir V. Kujawa  52, 
where, a notice  in English was displayed in a car , stating  that 
the  passengers  rode  at  their own  risk .This was  held  not  to 
bind  one  particular  passenger  who , to  the  driver's  own  
knowledge ,  spoke   German   but   little  English . 
        This view, it is submitted, reconciles a number of 
conflicting interests. On one hand, it guarantees the protection 
of illiterate persons. On the other hand, it is fair on   people 
dealing with them. To say  otherwise , is to shoulder  the  party  
pleading an  exemption clause either with  the burden  of  
investigating   the  literacy  status  of  the  other  party or  to 
hold him  accountable for a disability of another.  
 
(ii) Foreign Language 
 
          The second exception is provided for in section 
(120)(2)(b)  of  the  C.T.A.1984 . It is applicable to cases 
''where the term is written in a language which cannot be read 
by the other party, unless the contents of the term are 
sufficiently explained to him.'' 
         The  section  once  again  casts  the  burden  of  
explaining  the  term , on  the  party  benefiting from  it. This  
provision  has  introduced  a  revolutionary  legislative change 
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 on  the  pre-existing  position . It  was introduced  for the  first  
time  by  section  (52)(2)(b)  of  the  Contract Act 1974. Before   
that, the   position was totally different. Thus in : 
Sasso Bracale and Co V. Mohamed  Ahmad  Abdel Magid 
.53 
         The  defendant  was  a  peddler  from  a  Blue  Nile  
village . He signed  in  Khartoum  a  contract in English  for 
the purchase  of a lorry with the plaintiff. The terms of the 
contract where not explained to him .The contract included an 
exemption clause exempting the plaintiff from liability in 
respect   of  all  conditions  and  warranties .The defendant  
failed to honour certain promissory notes executed under the 
contract .When sued , the defendant pleaded  that there was a 
breach  of  a  warranty  by the plaintiff  and they lodged  a 
counter-claim for damages .       
         Judgment  was  given  for the  plaintiff  in  the High  
Court  and in the  Court of Appeal, and the defendant counter-
claim was dismissed .Both courts decided that the defendant 
became bound by all terms  of the contract once their signature 
was affixed to the document in which they were contained . 
Commenting on a similar decision , late  Z. Mustafa wrote :   
            ''One must confess that the decision is extremely harsh 
and very difficult to justify .It defies both authority and good 
sense and what is more it shakes to the foundations the 
principles of justice , equity and good conscience .'' 54 
            In  the  case of :  Engineering  Co. Ltd. V. Ahmad  
Fadl el Mula, 55 which  was   referred   to  above , the  District 
Judge , in obiter dictum, made a remark that the signature of a 
contract written in English by persons who do not know 
English is not binding at all on him .However, that view  was  
completely  rejected  by the Court of  Appeal .    
The  third  case  in  the  point  is : 
Sudan Mercantile Co. V. AbdelKarim Mustafa&  another 
56 
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           Terms in a contract written in English , signed  by  a 
party  who  does  not  read  English  were  held  to be binding  
on  that  party.    
          If a situation  similar to that  of  the  three  cases  
referred  to  above  arises  now , a completely different result 
will  be  predicted. The  signing  party will  be  availed  with  
the    strong   shield  of  section (120)(2)(b)  of  the  
C.T.A.1984 
 
 
(iii) Terms Difficult to be Read 
                          
           The  third  exception  to  the  general  rule  in  section  
(120)(2)  of  the  C.T.A.1984 ,  is  provided  for  in   sub-
section (c). It  is  applicable  to  cases :  
           ''Where it appears to the court that the party benefiting 
from the term has written it or put it in a manner that makes it 
difficult to read or understand with the intention of making it 
difficult for the other party to read it or understand it.''  
In English law , the issue was raised in : 
Richardson, Spence & Co. V.  Rowntree 57 
     The plaintiff contracted with the defendant to be taken as a 
passenger on a steamer from Philadelphia to Liverpool. She 
paid her fare and received a ticket containing a number of 
terms, one of which limited the liability of the defendants to 
$`100. The ticket was presented to her folded up, the 
conditions also being obliterated in part by a stamp in red ink. 
A jury found that the plaintiff knew that there were some 
words written on the ticket although she did not know that the 
writing contained terms of the contract. The question was thus 
posed whether reasonably sufficient notice had been given and 
the decision of the jury was that it had not. The House of 
Lords declined to interfere with that finding.     
 
The setting aside of signature 
 
     The effect of "signature" as a dispensation with "notice" is 
not always absolute. There are four overriding factors the 
proof of any of them may defuse the effect of signature and, 
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 consequently, the original requirement of "notice" to be given 
revives. These are: fraud, misrepresentation, the plea of non 
est factum and statutory disqualification. A party may escape 
being bound by a clause even if such clause is contained in a 
document which he signed has he proved that the signature 
was given by fraud or by misrepresentation or he may deny the 
fact of signature (non est factum) or he may depend on a 
statutory provision disqualifying signature as an embodiment 
of "notice" for one reason or another.  Of the later category, 
the provision of section 120 (2) of the C.T.A.1984, is an 
example. It has been discussed above at length. The remaining 
defences fall outside the ambit of this study. 
 
 
(C)Incorporation by Custom 
               
          The C.T.A 1984 caters for general principles in section 
(5). In sub-sections ( c) and ( d) reference is made to "custom". 
According to section (5) ( c ) of the C.T.A 1984, " a custom is 
binding whether it is general or special". Further, section (5) 
(d) of the same Act provides that "a custom shall be 
recognized where it is regular or frequent".  
              Despite the lack of direct authority in the point, and 
despite the general nature of the provisions of section (5), it 
can be invoked to support incorporation of exemption or 
limitation clauses if the circumstances so permit. 
             The argument will be that it is a custom in the parties’ 
dealings that a particular "exemption" or "limitation" clause is 
regularly incorporated. The "custom" here operates as a 
circumstance from which notice is to be inferred as to the 
knowledge of the other party of the existence of the clause or 
clauses. Has such circumstance proved to exist, it will give rise 
to an inference of notice, otherwise the clause will not be 
binding on the party against whom it is pleaded. Thus in 
Salama Abdel Shahid V. Singer Line Co.58 The plaintiff 
made a verbal agreement with the defendants to convey 212 
kantars of gum to Omdurman by boat. The plaintiff started to 
load the gum with the defendants' permission, but before 
loading was completed, the side of the boat gave way and 
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 some of the plaintiff's gum was damaged. The Bills of Lading 
used by the defendants contain the following condition: "All 
goods conveyed at risk of owners, contents and value 
unknown". The defendants had also issued advertisements 
stating that the above was the condition on which they 
conveyed goods. The plaintiff neither signed nor received any 
Bill of Lading. He had been a short time only at Dueim and 
had never shipped gum before. He contended that he was 
completely unaware of the conditions upon which the 
defendants carried on their business. It was held by Bonham 
Carter, C.J. , that:       
       " Under these circumstances the plaintiff is not bound by a 
special condition which it is the custom of the defendants to 
introduce in his Bill of Lading, but on what must be known to 
be the general law relating to carriers in this class of 
business."        
 
 
(D) Incorporation by Previous Course of Dealings 
                
               Now the question is whether or not the "notice" 
required by section (120) (1) of the C.T.A 1984 can be inferred 
from a "previous course of dealings" between the same parties. 
Though no single Sudanese judicial authority can directly be 
cited in support, a positive answer can be justified on the 
following grounds:  
 
Firstly, with reference to the letter of section (120) itself. The 
section does not impose a duty to give an express notice. It 
follows from this that the notice so required can be inferred 
from a previous course of dealings. 
Secondly, in one High Court decision, an unusual or novel 
limitation clause in a bill of lading was held to be not binding 
on a party who was not given notice of it. By subtraction, if the 
clause was usual , no such requirement would be required.59 
Obviously, a consistent course of dealings makes a clause 
usual. 
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             Any way, the "course of dealings" must be both 
"regular" and "consistent", otherwise, it will be hard to infer 
"notice" from it. 
         In English law, Lord  Pearce stated: 
           "It is the consistency of a  course of conduct which 
gives rise to the implication that in similar circumstances a 
similar contractual result will follow".60   
In that case, there had been a verbal contract followed the next 
day by a "sold note" which contained an exclusion clause. 
There had been more than a hundred similar contract notes in a 
course of dealing stretching back three years. The recipients 
knew of the existence of the written conditions but had never 
raised any query or obligation, although they had never read 
them. It was held that the recipients are bound by the terms on 
the grounds that the only reasonable inference from the regular 
course of dealings over so long a period is that the recipients 
were evincing an acceptance of and a readiness to be bound by 
those terms. 
          Henry Kendall's case is to be distinguished from that of  
McCutcheon V. David McBrayne Ltd.61 In the later the 
plaintiff's agent had dealt with the defendants on a number of 
occasions : Sometimes he had signed a risk note containing the 
relevant exclusion clauses and sometimes he had not. Not 
signed on the relevant occasion. It was held that the clauses 
were not part of the contract. 
          In the former, the contract was one of a regular series 
constituting a consistent course of dealing between the same 
parties. Whereas in the later, the Course of dealing between 
the parties was not so regular and the instant contract is but an 
isolated transaction. 
            In a third case, McCutcheon v MacBrayne  62, 
exclusion clauses were contained in 27 paragraphs of small 
print contained inside and outside a ferry booking office and in 
a 'risk note', which passengers sometimes signed. The 
exclusion clauses were held not to be incorporated. There was 
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 no course of conduct because there was no consistency of 
dealing. 
       In a recent American judicial decision passed Oct. 2002 
by the Washington State Supreme Court, the judges 
unanimously upheld the validity of a liability-limitation clause 
printed in a regular invoice for commercial services. The Court 
held that, where there is a history of trade usage or course of 
dealings between commercial parties with respect to a liability 
limitation, that term is not unconscionable. The Court regarded 
the trade usage and course of dealings as appropriate 
evidentiary doctrines for determining on the applicability of 
the exclusion or limitation clauses. However, the Court held 
that the validity of exclusion or limitation so made is not 
available in the so-called "integrated agreements".63 
 
 
Legal Control   of  Exemption  and  Limitation Clauses  
Under  Sudan  Law 
 
           Of the most sweeping and revolutionary changes ever 
made by Sudan law in the field of ''exemption and limitation 
clauses'' is that introduced by section (52)(4) of the repealed 
Contracts Act 1974, now section (120)(4) of the C.T.A.1984 . 
It was the first legislative endeavour to control these clauses 
against ''unjust'' or ''unfair'' use .The section reads:  
            "In all cases the Court may whenever it is satisfied that 
it is necessary to do so, refuse to enforce any exemption or 
limitation term which is clearly contrary to the spirit of the 
contract or clearly unjust to the party against whom it is to be 
invoked or if that term deprives such party of the rights which 
he contracted to enjoy or is contrary to law or public order''.                       
            The formula recognized by Sudan law for controlling 
the misuse of "exemption" and "limitation" clauses is summed-
up in this section. The legislature intended to avail the courts 
with wide discretionary powers to strike down or to set aside 
i.e. ''refuse to enforce'' terms proved to be: 
  (i)'' Clearly contrary to the spirit of the contract'' or,  
                                                 
63 -Puget Sound Financial Uc V. Unisearch, Barnews Publications, www. 
wsba. org   
  (ii)  ''Clearly unjust to the party against whom it is to be 
invoked'' or 
(iii)'' Depriving the party against whom it is to be invoked of 
his rights which he contracted to enjoy'' 
( iv)'' Contrary to law or public order''.            
           These heads are far-reaching. The first category is a 
virgin area of the law hitherto untested in a judicial process 
locally or abroad.  The second is the most enacting area and 
will be discussed in this chapter at length. The third is 
associated with the question of fundamental breach, an issue to 
be discussed later. The fourth is introduced for the first time by 
the C.T.A.1984 and will be discussed in this chapter with 
reference to material from comparative jurisdictions as far as 
the local literature is not availing.  
 
 
Unfair Contract Terms under the C.T.A.1984 
             
             The first remark to be made is that the Act neither 
introduces a definition to the expression ''unjust'' nor does it 
cater for any yardsticks or standards whereby a term can be 
judged '' unjust '' or not. The legislature appears to reserve this 
role for the courts. The English Unfair Contracts Terms 
Act1977, for example, is supplemented with the Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, which define "unfair 
terms" and list out terms some are "unfair" per se, others are to 
be subjected to a test of reasonableness in judicial scrutiny.   
           By contrast, the judicial discretion recognized by the 
Sudanese Act is of a wider scope because the courts are 
empowered to determine what is "unjust" and what is not. 
Courts dispose of the different factual situations in a case-by-
case handling i.e. to take each case according to its own 
merits. This approach has positive as well as negative impacts 
(pros and cons). "Flexibility" is its main positive characteristic. 
It enables the courts to evolve their own rules and to give 
effect to the ever-changing circumstances. On the other hand, 
lack of "predictability" is a converse negative feature of the 
wide judicial discretion, particularly in a system less abiding 
by the principle of stare decisis. In such a system, different 
 conclusions, sometimes contradictory, are probable. This 
detracts from the advantages that flexibility may achieve.  
              The following judicial precedents decided after 1974, 
are examples of the attitude of Sudan courts to the question of 
control. Strikingly, four judicial decisions were passed by 
Sudan courts posing identical issues on similar situations 
thereby affording a suitable ground for analysis and contrast to 
see whether Sudan courts were consistent. These are: 
 
Sudan Railways Corporation V. AbdelHameed AlMahdi 
Mustafa 64 
 
        Respondent entered into a contract with Applicant for the 
carriage of a cattle of cows from Khartoum to Halfa. 
Applicant's employees neither supplied the cattle with water 
nor let it be dropped at the stations for drinking water. As a 
result, 31 of the cattle perished.  Respondent brought an action 
claiming 60 pounds per head by way of compensation. 
Applicant pleaded an exemption clause contained in clause 
19(2)(a) of the Conditions of Carriage Regulations 1939 
incorporated into the contract by reference. Applicant pleaded, 
alternatively, a limitation clause incorporated by clause(20) of 
the same Regulations providing a compensation of 15 pounds 
per head. 
           Judgment was delivered for Applicant by a province 
court and later by the Court of Appeal. 
           In the Supreme Court, the decisions of the lower courts 
were reversed. Alsadiq Abdalla J., delivering the judgment, 
refrained to apply the exemption clause in article 19(2)(a) on 
the ground that it is not applicable where the alleged damage 
was "occasioned by the willful misconduct of the applicant's 
employees". The learned judge also rejected the plea founded 
on the limitation clause of section(20) of the Regulations. He 
concluded that a term limiting the liability of Applicant to 15 
pounds in compensation for a calf which price proved to be 60 
pounds is "unjust" and consequently void under section (52)(4) 
of the Contracts Act 1974.  
The second case is: 
                                                 
   64 -   (1978) S.L.J.R  
 Sudan  Railways Corporation V. Ali Mohamed Algossi 65 
         Respondent entered into a contract with Applicant for the 
carriage of 31 tons of banana from Khartoum to Port Sudan by 
refrigerated wagons. In route, the cooling system of the 
wagons broke down. Applicant's technician requested his 
administration to provide him with batteries for rescue .The 
administration refused .The journey was five days late . 27 
tons of banana got rotten. Respondent brought an action 
claiming damages. Province court gave judgment in favour of 
Respondent. On appeal, Appellant pleaded an exemption 
clause contained in clause(19) of the Conditions of Carriage 
and Storage Regulations 1939 incorporated in the contract by 
reference. The Court of Appeal rejected the plea and upheld 
the decision of the province court. Reference, with approval, 
was made to AbdelHameed's  case above . 
The third case is: 
Mahdi AbdelHameed AlMahdi V .Sudan Railways 
Corporation 66 
             The facts of this case are almost identical with those in 
AbdelHameed AlMahdi referred to above. In the first case, 
the present Respondent was confronting the father and this 
time; his son. The Supreme Court arrived at a conclusion 
completely different despite the close similarity of the two 
situations. Clause (20) of the same Regulations was 
incorporated in the present contract by reference. It was 
pleaded by Respondent as a term limiting their liability to Ls. 
3 per head for compensation against loss of a single lamb. A 
decision completely contrary to those in the above cases was 
given by the Court of Appeal which considered the clause to 
be ''Category of Legislation'' and ,as such, binding. The Court 
cited with approval the statement of Huges J. who  stressed , 
in a similar situation, that courts are literally bound by 
legislations: ''…and here it has done so, it is not my province 
to enquire further ''  67 The Supreme Court confirmed the 
decision adding that: '' As far as clause (20)(2)(b) plainly limits 
the liability of Respondent to a  specified sum ,  there  is no 
room for a contrary  interpretation whatever the justification 
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 might have been .  To say otherwise is to contravene  a 
legislative provision''. 
The fourth case  is:  
 Sudan Railways Corporation V. Elhaj Ali Kurduman  68                   
         Respondent entered into a contract for the carriage of a 
cattle of 500 sheep from Kadaro Station to Port Sudan. It was 
commonly known by the parties that the journey would take a 
maximum of 30 hours. The train took 7 days to reach its 
destiny. Applicant neither provided the cattle with water nor 
let Respondent do. The cattle were taken on flat uncovered 
wagons. 250 out of the whole cattle perished due to those 
severe circumstances. Respondent sued for damages. Before 
the Supreme Court, Applicant pleaded the limitation term in 
clause 20 of the Conditions of Carriage and Storage 
Regulations 1939 incorporated in the contract by reference. 
The court accepted the plea . Henri Riyad J.., referring to 
clause 20 stated:      
            ''In my view the clause is a statutory provision 
applicable even if appears to be unjust or unreasonable.''                                  
          By comparing the four decisions above, one can 
conclude that the attitude of Sudan courts toward the concept 
of ''unjust'' exemption or limitation terms is inconsistent. The 
same factual situation, which was rejected as being ''unjust'' in 
two occasions, was upheld in the other two. This inconsistency 
reflects the inefficiency of the protective system recognized by 
Sudan law.   
   The question whether or not Sudan courts adhere to the 
doctrine of stare decisis worth discussion. It has crucial 
bearing on the system of judicial control of exemption and 
limitation clauses particularly in Sudan where courts are 
availed with wide powers.  
  At the statutory level, the Basis of Judicial Decisions Act 
1983 (Ossool Al Ahkaam) has enacted the doctrine in section 
3(b) (VI). However, the application of the doctrine as provided 
for in section 3 of the said Act is subject to a proviso viz. Not 
being contrary to Sharia law or Islamic Jurisprudence.. 
Fortunately, the same judgments above had dealt with the 
issue but, unfortunately, with, again, much inconsistency. 
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    In the judgment of Al Gossi, the previous decision in 
AbdelHameed case was followed and declared binding on 
subsequent similar cases. The judge of the Supreme Court 
addressed the issue directly by saying: 
''It is settled law that where a preceding judicial decision is in 
conflict with another subsequent decision and both decisions 
were on similar facts, the subsequent decision must be 
followed.''  69 
 However, the Supreme Court in the case of:  Sudan Railways 
Corporation V. Elhaj Ali Kurduman 70, arrived at a contrary 
conclusion. The court expressly refused to follow the decision 
in AbdelHameed's case although it was the latest   preferring, 
that in Mahdi AbdeHameed which was the former. To justify, 
Henri Riyad J.  Stated: 
 ''It is not sufficient to depend merely on a previous decision 
even if the previous decision followed was the latest. It is a 
duty to follow the decision compatible with the sound 
interpretation of legal provisions and introducing reasonable, 
logical and fair results.'' 
      To conclude, the system adopted by Sudan law for 
controlling the use of exemption and limitation clauses 
sustains, so far, uncertainty. Unless the present statement of 
the law is revised, supplemented with clear statutory standards 
or clear judge-made rules are worked out, the wide discretion 
guaranteed by the Act to the courts will not lead to consistency 
in judgments nor will it lead to predictability in judicial 
decisions. To realize consistency, the Act must provide a 
criterion for determining what constitutes ''unjust'' terms or at 
least lay down standards to be applied in determining what is 
"unjust" and what is not. It may be, further, supplemented with 
a list of ''unjust'' terms equivalent to that recognized by the 
English Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 or the statutory 
arrangement adopted by other comparative jurisdictions.     
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 Terms Contrary to Law or Public Order 
 
      The closing words of section (120) (4) of the C.T.A.1984 
have introduced an unprecedented novelty into Sudan law. 
Terms, which "are contrary to law or public order" are, 
statutorily, rendered unenforceable. Neither the Contract Act 
1974, nor the judicial precedents decided before 1974 had 
recognized a similar provision. However, despite the sweeping 
scope it implies, the provision has never been tested in judicial 
proceedings since 1984. Whether or not a given contract term 
is "contrary to law", depends on the "law" in question and the 
relevant factual situation. The alleged violation may be 
obvious or it may require some sort of judicial scrutiny. 
        The second provision viz. "contrary to public order", is 
more controversial. This may be due to its inflated flexibility 
and far-reaching scope. The case law is expected to delimit its 
boundaries and broadly define it, but this is still a virgin area 
not only in the law of Sudan, but also in comparative systems. 
Even under the American system where the issue is recurring, 
the exact scope is not clear. Thus, an American writer, 
referring to contracts releasing a party from liability for 
injuries caused by negligence and to whether or not such 
contracts are "contrary to public order ", found that:  "The 
rules and principles deducible from the opinion of the courts 
are not always clear." 71 The same American writer concluded 
that: "Whether or not such a contract is invalid as violative of 
public policy depends on a complexity of considerations." 
Considerations referred to in that statement including, but not 
limited to, the existence of a duty to the public, the nature of 
the service performed, whether the contract was fairly entered 
into, and whether the intention of the parties was expressed in 
clear and unambiguous language.  
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 Chapter III 
Exemption Clauses in Comparative Jurisprudence 
Introduction ——English Law—American Law  
 
Introduction 
    This chapter is devoted to the treatment of "exemption" and 
"limitation" clauses by comparative jurisprudence. It is 
intended to examine the experience of certain foreign 
jurisdictions in as far as they provide pointers towards 
questions not yet solved in Sudan, or to the extent that they can 
be used for explaining local legal rules wherever local 
literature proves to be unavailing. Special focus will be made 
on the English and the American systems. The English for its 
historical relations with Sudan law, and the American for the 
close similarity to Sudan law in this respect. The concept of 
''contractual unconscionability'' will be the sole issue in 
considering the American system.  This is intended to present 
a (horizontal comparison) i.e. comparing the local rules with 
the corresponding foreign rules. Moreover, it presents a 
(vertical comparison) i.e. comparing the present statement of 
the local rules with their corresponding rules used to be 
applied during different historical phases within the same 
Sudanese system. In the preceding chapters, the vertical 
comparison was dealt with at length. The horizontal 
comparison will be discussed bellow. 
    Eventually, we will have an array of four grounds for 
comparing the present rules of the C.T.A. 1984: Two for the 
vertical comparison: The position before 1974, the position 
under the Contracts Act 1974, and two for the horizontal 
comparison: English law and American law. 
 
 1\ The English System 
               
              The importance of studying the approach of English 
law to "exemption" and "limitation" clauses is twofold:  
First, it is one of the major historical sources of the Sudanese 
legal system. It happened to be applied in Sudan for more than 
half a century and, that many of the present commercial law 
rules owe their origin to that period. 
 Second, it affords an indispensable ground for comparison. 
             Much ink has been exerted in the treatment of 
"exemption" and "limitation" clauses by English law, whether 
statute law or common law. Common law has laid down the 
rules dealing with different aspects of "exemption" and 
"limitation" clauses including, but not limited to: 
Interpretation, requirements of enforceability, effect and 
judicial control. Statute law, on the other hand, is mainly 
concerned with the question of legal control of "exemption" 
and "limitation" clauses. Such control is largely, but by no 
means exclusively, in the field of "consumer protection". Full 
and detailed analysis of the English approach falls outside the 
ambit of this study. This chapter specifically highlights some 
key elements as basic grounds for comparison with Sudan law 
and for contrast with other jurisdictions.  
 
 (1) The Role and Significance of "Exemption" and 
''Limitation" Clauses 
 
          In English jurisprudence, there are divergent views as to 
what "exemption" and "limitation" clauses do. 
           One view is that such clauses go to define the 
promisor's obligation. According to this view, one should read 
the contract as a whole and decide what it is that the promisor 
has agreed to do. Thus in:  
GH Renton & Co. Ltd. V. Palmyra trading corp. of 
Panama. 72 
           R. issued bills of lading covering the shipment of timber 
from ports in British Colombia to London. The bills were 
subject to the Hague Rules. A clause in the bill permitted the 
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 master to discharge at the port of loading or any convenient 
port in the event of industrial disputes at the port of delivery. A 
strike broke out among dockworkers in the port of London. 
The master discharged the cargo at Hamburg. P argued that the 
discharge at Hamburg was a breach of contract, that the strike 
clause did not provide an effective defence since it sought to 
provide a relief of liability contrary to the Hague Rules.  
          The House of Lords held that R. had not broken the 
contract since the strike clauses did not provide a defence in 
the event of misperformance, but went to define what was that 
the carrier had agreed to do. 
           The second view considers "exemption" and 
"limitation" clauses as mere defences. According to this view, 
one should first construe the contract without regard to the 
exemption clauses in order to discover the promisor's 
obligation and only then consider whether the clauses provide 
a defence to breach of those obligations. 
              The difference between the two views above is not 
merely theoretical. It likely provides significantly different 
results in many cases. According to Cheshire, some clauses, 
e.g. clauses limiting the amount of damages that can be 
recovered, look like defences, while others are more naturally 
regarded as defining the obligation. 73   
 
2/ Requirements as to the Validity of the Clauses 
                      
              For an "exemption" or a "limitation" clause to be 
upheld by the courts, English common law imposes two basic 
requirements to be satisfied: viz. 
             The document containing the clause must be validly 
incorporated in the contract, and that reasonable notice of the 
term has been given to the other party. As discussed elsewhere 
in this  study74, the clause must be included in a "contractual 
document".   It must be "an integral part" of that document 
and not a mere receipt of payment. Reasonable notice of the 
existence of the term must be given to the party against whom 
the term is pleaded. Concerning the requirement of "notice", a 
distinction is drawn between "written" and "unwritten" terms. 
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 Where terms are "written" and "signed" by the party against 
whom the terms are pleaded, such terms will be binding on 
him. On the other hand, where the terms are "unwritten", or 
are "unsigned", they will be binding only where "reasonable 
notice" as to their existence has been given. English law 
requires the party benefiting from the term "to do what is 
sufficient to draw the other party's attention to the terms".75  
Whether or not the party benefiting from the terms has done 
so, is a question of fact depending on the circumstances of 
each case. 
           In Sudan, the position is almost the same as far as the 
general rule is concerned. Thus, section 120(1) of the C.T.A. 
1984, 76provides for the possibility of   "exempting" from; or 
"limiting" the liability of; a party to a contract and that the 
exempting or limiting terms must be  "specified"  in the 
contract. The same section imposes the requirement of 
"notice" as a condition for enforcing the terms. Sub-section (2) 
of the same section, provides for " signed documents" as an 
exception to the requirement of notice. Sudan and English law 
are pro tanto similar. However, Sudan law has gone further in 
restricting the "signed document" exception. The same sub-
section excludes the applicability of the exception to 
"illiterate" persons or persons "unable to read the document" 
which he himself had signed or affixed his seal or thump print. 
The justifications and the practical application of these 
principles of Sudan law were discussed above.  77  
           English courts have evolved rules relating to the 
question of "timing of notice" 78  English law does not 
recognize a belated notice i.e. notice not given "before" the 
conclusion of the contract. Sudan law recognizes the same 
principle in section 120(1) of the C.T.A.1984 in its proviso: 
"before the conclusion of the contract." 
            English courts admitted notice based on custom where 
there is an applicable custom in the parties dealings to the 
effect that a particular "exemption" or "limitation" clause is 
regularly incorporated. The same is true as to Sudan law. 
                                                 
75 - Thornton V. Shoe Lane Parking ltd [1971]2 Q.B. 163  
76 -  Chapter II above.     
77 - Chapter II above 
78 - Olley  V. Marlborough  Court  LTD, supra, note 36  
 79Again, the notice required by English law to be given may be 
inferred from a consistent course of dealings between the same 
parties. 80 However, this is a virgin area in Sudan law which is 
neither covered by a statutory provision nor by a direct judicial 
precedent.  
 
  
(3)  Exemption Clauses and Third Parties 
              Two fundamental doctrines of English law are 
conflicting in this area. These are the doctrine of privity of 
contract and the doctrine of vicarious immunity. The later is 
established on the law of agency, whereas the former is an 
elaborate doctrine of English law. Both doctrines have an 
impact on ''exemption '' and ''limitation'' clauses but with 
different force. The doctrine of "privity of contract" implies a 
negative answer  if it has been rigorously applied, whereas the 
doctrine of "vicarious immunity" implies a positive  answer to 
the question of whether or not the effect of an "exemption 
clause" can successfully be extended to cover a third party to 
the contract which includes that  clause. 
             The typical situation arises where a contract between 
X and Z includes a clause exempting Z from liability or 
limiting it regarding personal injury to X or damage or loss of 
X's goods. 
             Assuming that Y is an employee or servant of Z and 
that the injury, loss or damage complained of is due to Y's 
negligence. In an action by X against Y, the question will be: 
Can Y successfully depend on the "exemption clause"? 
          To take the view based on the "doctrine of privity of 
contract" ,   it can be argued that as  far as a contract cannot, as 
a general rule, confer rights or impose obligations on persons 
who are not parties to it, a third party cannot benefit from a 
term in that contract. In the example referred to above, Y 
cannot benefit from the clause in an action brought by X 
against Y because Y is not privy to the contract and 
consequently, cannot depend on its terms. In the spheres of 
exemption and limitation clauses, the doctrine prevents non-
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80 - Henry Kendall & Sons V. William Lillico & Sons ,Supra note 60 
 parties from receiving any benefits or shouldering any burdens 
from the clauses. 
         Historically in England, the doctrine of privity emerged 
alongside the doctrine of "consideration", the rules of which 
state that "consideration must move from the promisee". In the 
field of "exemption" and "limitation" clauses, this notion was 
upheld by the English Court of Appeal at least in two 
situations. Thus in: Adler V. Dickson: 81 
           The plaintiff was a passenger in the vessel Himalaya of 
P. Navigation Company. The ticket contained terms exempting 
the company from liability in a general clause that "passengers 
are carried at passengers entire risk" and a particular clause 
that "the Company will not be responsible for any injury what 
ever to the person of any passenger arising from or 
occasioned by the negligence of the company's servants''. 
While the plaintiff was amounting a gangway, it moved and 
fell and she was thrown into the Warf and sustained serious 
injuries. She brought an action for negligence, not against the 
company, but against the master and boatswain of the ship. 
           The ratio decidendi of the court of appeal decision was 
that the ticket did not, on its true construction; purport to 
exempt the master or boatswain. It protected the company 
only. The position in which the ticked provides for an 
exemption to both the master and boatswain, was considered, 
obiter, by the Court of Appeal. According to Jenkins LJ, ''Even 
if these provisions had contained words purporting to exclude 
the liability of the Company's servants non constant that the 
Company's servants could successfully rely on that 
exclusion…..for the Company's servants are not parties to the 
contract.'' To this conclusion, Morris LJ agreed but Denning 
LJ dissented.The same court made a similar finding in :      
 
      
Cosgrove V. Horsfall. 82 
        The plaintiff had a free pass for buses run by the London 
passenger Transport Board of which he was an employee. The 
terms of the pass were that neither the Board nor their servants 
were to be liable to the holder for injuries however caused. 
                                                 
81 -(1967) 1 A. C. 361 
82 -  (1945) 62 T. L. R . 140 
 The plaintiff suffered personal injuries as the result of the 
negligence of the defendant bus driver whom he sued 
personally. The Court of Appeal held the driver liable. He 
could not claim the benefit of the exemption clause as he was 
not a party to the contract.  
           Eventually, the House of Lords endorsed the approach 
of the Court of Appeal in the case of :  
Scrutton LTD V. Midland Silicones LTD. 83 
           A contract between the plaintiff and the carrier for the 
carriage of drum chemicals from the United States to the 
United Kingdom. The contract contained a clause limiting the 
liability of the carrier to 500 Dollars. The defendants were 
stevedores contracted with the carrier to act for them in 
London on the terms that the defendants were to have the 
benefit on the limiting clause in the bill of lading. When the 
chemicals were being unloaded, they were damaged through 
the negligence of the defendants. 
            Lord Denning in a dissenting judgment considered that 
the defendant stevedores could claim the benefit of the 
exclusion clause since the plaintiff consignee had assented to 
the limitation of liability in the bill of lading contract of 
carriage. However, the majority held that the defendants could 
not claim the benefit of a limitation clause contained in a 
contract to which they were not parties. 
            The second view was that of "vicarious immunity" 
which derives from the law of agency. Thus, where a person 
employs an agent to perform a contract, that agent is entitled- 
in performing the contract- to any immunity from liability, 
which the contract confers on the principal. This principle of 
"vicarious immunity" was established in the speech of 
Viscount Cane who stated: 
           "It may be that the owner was not directly parties to the 
contract, but they took possession of the goods ….on behalf of 
and as the agents of the charterers, and so can claim the same 
protection of their principal. 84      
            In that case, a company entered into a contract with the 
plaintiff for the carriage of a cargo of palm oil from West 
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84- Edler Dempster & Co. V. Patterson Zochonis & Co. (1924), AC 522 
 Africa to England. The company chartered a vessel for that 
purpose. The contract of carriage contained an exclusion 
clause purported to exclude liability both from themselves as 
charters and from the defendant ship-owners against bad 
stowage. It is obvious that the ship-owners were not parties to 
the contract of carriage. The immediate parties were the 
company and the plaintiff. The barrels of oil were damaged by 
bad stowage. The plaintiff sued both the charterers (The 
Company) and the ship-owners. The House of Lords held that 
the clause not only protected the charterers, but also the ship-
owner against the consequences of bad stowage. The plaintiff's 
action consequently failed.  
           It is now clear that under English law, there was 
authority for preventing third party from benefiting from an 
exemption clause on ground of lack of privity of contract, but 
there was also authority to the contrary on ground of vicarious 
immunity. At first, the prevention was dominant. However, 
that dominance was heavily affected in two directions: One is 
judicial and the other is statutory. English common law 
recognized a number of exceptions to the doctrine of privity. 
Examples are "collateral contracts" between a third party and 
one of the contracting parties, "trust cases" wherein the 
beneficiary of a trust may sue the trustee to carry out the 
contract, "land law" where restrictive  covenants on land are 
imposed against subsequent purchasers if the covenant benefits 
a neighboring land and "the doctrine of undisclosed principal" 
of agency law 85. Besides these extensive exceptions, the 
Contract (Rights of Third Parties ) Act 1999, has added a 
significant statutory step in favour of third parties to benefit 
from contract terms.   
Under Sudan law, the general rule of privity of contract is 
provided for in section (111) of the C.T.A.1984, which has re-
enacted section (55) of its predecessor the Contracts Act 1974, 
but with a slight addition. The Contracts Act 1974 provided: 
 (Subject to the provisions of this Act or any other law and 
without prejudice to the rules governing succession after 
death, a contract shall produce no effect except between the 
contracting parties).Whereas the C.T.A 1984 provides: 
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     " Without prejudice to the rules governing succession after 
death, a contract shall produce effect only on its parties and 
their general successors   (Alkhalaf Alaam), unless it appears 
from the contract or the nature of the transaction or the law 
that such effect shall not extend to the general successors".  
        However, as in many jurisdictions, Sudan law has 
subjected the doctrine of privity to major exceptions. Under 
section(124)(1) of the C.T.A. 1984, a contract may confer 
rights on a third party and such third party can enforce  the 
rights so stipulated. A carrier, for example, may postulate a 
term exempting them from liability or limiting their liability to 
a specified sum. The same term may be made applicable 
further to a third party being an agent, servant or otherwise of 
that carrier. The Conditions of Carriage of Goods Regulations 
of the Sudan Railway Corp. of 1939, used to exempt the 
Corporation from liability against loss or damage to goods 
consigned "at the owners risk". The Regulations extended that 
exemption to the employees of the Corporation. 86This was an 
obvious deviation from the doctrine of privity. However, the 
scope of this exception under Sudan law is restricted in two 
ways: 
First, section(158) of the C.T.A. 1984  expressly states that" 
any condition or provision relieving from liability for injury-
causing acts shall be held void." Second, section (120)(4)  
renders void any term which is " unjust or  contrary to law or 
public order."        
            It is submitted that as far as the exclusion of tortious 
liability is not legally available to a contracting party it is, a 
fortiori, not available to a third party. The sole area in which 
an exemption or a limitation clause can be extended to a third 
party under Sudan law is where the exemption or limitation 
terms are originally valid in favour of one party, and that party 
extends their application to a third party. It follows from this 
that the position of Sudan law is almost identical with the 
English position created by the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999, and the demands of the doctrine of 
"vicarious immunity".    
                                                 
86 - However, the present Regulations of 1999 do not adopt the same 
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  (4) Legislative Control 
           
              The English Parliament made successive interventions 
with a view to control and regulate the use of exemption and 
limitation clauses in contracts. However, the parliamentary 
intervention is considered to have been, so far, as only 
piecemeal. Only particular types of contracts are covered by 
statutes creating different aspects of legislative control 87. The 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (U.C.T.A.) is the most 
important piece of legislation in the area of legal control. It is 
now supplemented with The Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 (U.T.C.C.R.).      
 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (U.C.T.1977) 
 
             A notable English jurist noticed: "The title of the Act is 
grossly misleading. It does not deal in principle with all unfair 
contract terms but only with unfair exemption clauses. It does 
not in general, deal with unfair imposition of liability."  88 
           The Act provides for two types of terms: Terms, which 
are considered ineffective per se, and terms, which are 
subjected to a test of reasonableness. 
                                         
(i)  Terms which are totally ineffective under the Act:  
These are four types of terms relating to: " Personal injury or 
death", " Implied undertakings as to title",  " Conformity with 
description and sample", " Fitness for the purpose". 
 
(a) "Personal Injury or Death: 
 
            Under section 2(1) of the U.C.T. 1977, exclusions or 
limitations of liability in negligence for personal injury or 
death are void. The section is applicable both to contractual as 
well as tortious liability. In contracts, it is applicable to all 
                                                 
              
87 - Examples are: The Road Traffic Act 1960, The Transport Act 1962, 
The fair Trading Act 1973.                                                                                                       
88 -Cheshire, Supra note 8, P. 197.                                                                                           
 
 types of contracts, whereas in torts it is applicable only to 
consumer contracts. 
            In Sudan, the position is the same but in terms far-
reaching than under English law regarding tortious liability. 
Thus, section (158) of the C.T.A. 1984 provides " Any term or 
clause purports to exempt a party from any tort-based liability 
shall be rendered void". The Supreme Court held in:        
Hamid Mohamed Al Hassan V. Heirs of Alya Abdel 
Hameed  that,   "Any term or clause purports to exclude 
tortious liability is rendered void by section 158 of the C.T.A. 
1984" . 89 
        However, section(158) does make no reference to 
limitation of liability. What will the position be if a party 
limits his liability in negligence to a specific sum without 
excluding his liability altogether?  Unless it is argued that 
limitation itself is but an instance of exemption, it will be hard 
to conclude that limitation of liability is covered by this 
section.  
          In contracts, section (120) (4) invalidates exclusion 
clauses which are "contrary to law". As far as "causing death" 
or" bodily injury" by negligent act or omission are crimes 
under the Criminal Act 1991 SS.(132 ) and (139), (142) and 
section  (49) of the Road Traffic Act 1983 in traffic cases, they 
cannot be excluded by agreement of the parties to a contract, 
being "contrary to law" within the purview of section (120)(4) 
of the C.T.A. 1984.   
          It is now clear that there is a major difference in this 
area between Sudan and English law. Whereas Sudan law 
invalidates terms purport to exclude all kinds of tort-based 
liability (S.158), English law restricts such invalidation to a 
specific kind: "causing death" or "personal injury". The 
exclusion of liability to losses other than "death or personal 
injury" are in English law, subject to a test of reasonableness 
i.e. not void per se.  
                                                                                                                               
 (b) " Implied Undertakings as to Title" 
           Section (12) of the English Sale of Goods Act 1893 
used to operate by implying on the seller an obligation, inter 
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 alia, as to title of the goods. This obligation was subject to a 
contrary agreement of the parties i.e. the seller could validly 
exclude such obligation. However, that possibility is no longer 
opened because of section (6) (1) of the U.C.T Act 1977. It 
renders void any contract term purport to exclude this seller's 
obligation. It worth note that the Sale of Goods Act 1893 is 
repealed by the present Sale of Goods Act 1979. It worth note, 
further, that in the present Act there is no room for excluding 
the obligation of the seller as to title by the agreement of the 
parties.    
          In Sudan, since 1974, exclusion of seller's obligation as 
to title in the goods is not possible. Section (12) of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1974, used to impose an obligation on sellers as to 
the title in the goods. The section, like the English Act of 
1979, was not made subject to a contrary agreement of the 
parties. This had led to a conclusion that exclusion of that 
statutory obligation is legally invalid. Up to this extent, Sudan 
law as represented by the Sale of Goods Act 1974, was 
identical with English law. However, the English statute is also 
applicable to hire purchase contracts, whereas the Sudanese 
Act was only devoted to sale. Hire purchase contacts or any 
type of contract other than sale remained in the gray area of 
uncertainty regarding the validity of exclusion of the seller's 
obligation as to title under Sudan law up to 1974. 
   The C.T.A. 1984, has dealt with sale in Part Five in five 
chapters including, inclusively, sections (178-228). Section 
(227) provides for the buyer's right to repudiate the contract 
where the seller is a non-owner of the subject-matter of the 
contract. This right of repudiation cannot be excluded.    
 
(c) "Conformity with Description or Sample"    
 
           Under section (6) (2) of the U.C.T. 1977, the seller or 
owner's implied undertakings as to conformity of goods with 
description or sample cannot be excluded or restricted. 
However, this section is applicable only in consumer contracts. 
Non-consumer sale contracts are not covered by this section. It 
is therefore possible for a seller who deals with a non-
consumer, to exclude or restrict the undertaking implied on 
him, that the goods conform to the description or sample. 
           The Contracts Act 1974, used to provide for "sale by 
sample" in section (16) which reads: "If a sale is by sample, 
the goods must conform to the sample in all respects". The 
section came under Part (III) which is entitled: "Duties of the 
seller". The same is now adopted by Section (180) of the 
C.T.A. 1984 under the title: " Definition of sale". However, the 
present Act is silent as to whether or not exclusion of the 
seller's undertaking is valid. Under its predecessor, a negative 
answer can be inferred. It is submitted that under the present 
law, sections (120)(4) and (158) of the C.T.A 1984 can 
collectively be invoked to lead to the same negative answer.     
                                                           
(d)Quality of the Goods and Fitness for the Purpose: 
 
           The repealed English Sale of Goods Act 1893 and its 
corollaries, 90 imposed a duty on sellers as to the quality of the 
goods and their fitness for a particular purpose. Under section 
(6) of the U.C.T.A 1977, the exclusion of this duty is totally 
ineffective in consumer contracts. In non-consumer contracts, 
the purport exclusion is subjected to a test of reasonableness 
i.e. the court will investigate the whole transaction to decide 
whether such exclusion is "reasonable" or not. Again, the 
present Act has introduced a significant change similar to that 
made on the implied undertaking as to title.91 
         Unlike English law, Sudan law does not distinguish 
between terms which are totally ineffective (void per se) and 
those which are subjected to a test of reasonableness. It is 
therefore less complicated. This is true at least as far as the 
repealed Act of 1974 is concerned. However, the current 
position of Sudan law is totally different. Rules governing the 
sale of defective goods are now based on Islamic law. They are 
more or less in line with the rules of "The law of Obligations" 
as recognized in Civil law of some European countries. They 
both empower the buyer to "reject" the goods if proved to be 
defective. An elaborate system of rules governing the scope 
and the effect of exercising the right to reject defective goods 
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ambit of this study. Reference is devoted here to the question of 
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 guaranteed to buyers is provided for by the C.T.A.1984. 
Sections  (202 ),(203) of the C.T.A 1984 are inclusively 
devoted to that role. It follows from this that the seller's 
statutory  undertaking to deliver goods free from defects, 
cannot be excluded because such purported exclusion will be 
contrary to, both,  sections (118) and (120) of the C.T.A. 1984.                         
The position before 1974 was comparable to the position after 
it because Sudan courts went the same way. Thus in: 
 
EL Rashid Hamza koko V. Kamal Khalafalla  92              
         Plaintiff bought a new refrigerator from defendant, and 
signed a document called “Contract of Purchase” without 
reading it. Clause 6 of this document stated that the buyer had 
examined the refrigerator before signing and had been satisfied 
with its condition, and that no guarantee as to the 
merchantability, fitness for any purpose or otherwise was to be 
implied. The refrigerator was completely defective, since it 
would not refrigerate at all. Plaintiff sued defendant for the 
return of the price paid. Defendant relied in his defence on 
clause 6 of the “Contract of Purchase.” It was held that " A 
seller of goods who is sued by the buyer for breach of an 
implied warranty of fitness for the buyer’s purpose cannot rely 
on an exemption clause in a written contract signed by the 
buyer which excludes such terms from being implied into the 
contract, where the buyer’s purpose for the goods was the 
ordinary purpose to which such goods are put, which was 
obvious from the nature of the goods bought." 
        The case was decided before 1974. The conclusion, but 
not the  judicial reasoning thereof, would  have not been 
different had the case been brought before the court under the 
repealed Contracts Act 1974 , or even under the present Act.   
(ii) Terms subjected to a test of reasonableness: 
         The test of " reasonableness"  stands at the heart of the 
strategy of the English U.C.T.A. 1977 . A number of exclusion 
or limitation clauses are subject to a test of "reasonableness". 
Although this orientation reflects the modern tendency of 
objectivity in contract law generally, it has been criticized in 
England. The fact that the same contract term may be 
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 "reasonable" in certain circumstances and may not be so in 
others, prompts a case by case handling, an approach ipso 
facto  less welcomed in England. To realize consistency, the 
Act provides some guidance in section (11) and schedule (2) 
for determining on whether or not an excluding or a limiting 
term is "reasonable" viz. 
---Regarding time of application of the test, the terms must be 
"reasonable" at the time "when the contract was made". 
---Regarding the burden of proof, it is for the person alleging 
the "reasonableness" of the term to show that it is.   
         It is now clear that a contract term excluding or limiting 
an obligation imposed on one party by statute may be void, 
subject to a test of reasonableness or valid. The position of 
English law toward these kinds of excluding or limiting terms 
can be summarized as follows: 
⇒Terms excluding Personal Injury or Death = Void in all 
types of contracts. 
⇒ Terms excluding Damage or Loss other than Personal 
Injury or Death = Subject to a test of Reasonableness in all 
types of contracts.  
⇒Terms excluding obligations as to conformity of goods 
with sample or description = Void ab initio in consumer 
contracts = Subject to a test of reasonableness in non-
consumer contracts. 
⇒Terms excluding obligations as to quality or fitness for the 
purpose of the goods = Void ab initio in consumer contracts 
= Subject to a test of reasonableness in non-consumer 
contracts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Consumer Protection 
 
        In a previous chapter, it was concluded that the concept of 
freedom of contract and its derivative, the will theory have 
universally withdrawn during the last and the present century. 
The English system is not an exception. In the field of contract 
law, the process of mass production achieved by increasingly 
sophisticated technology has led to inequality in bargaining 
power. Consumers, for example, are no longer in a position to 
estimate the efficiency and durability of machines such as cars, 
computer devices and electric house equipments. This fact 
created an inroad to legal intervention to maintain the 
equilibrium. It is for the law to step in to strike a balance. The 
mechanisms thereof are generally statutory or judicial. The 
scope or pattern of such intervention differs from one 
jurisdiction to another. The European Union has been very 
active in the field of consumer protection. It is producing a 
considerable volume of directives, which require member 
states to regulate consumer protection to a particular standard. 
A directive may or may not allow a higher standard of 
regulation. The Directive on Unfair Contract Terms 
(93/13/EC) is one of the most important. In England, it was 
implemented, at first, by the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations(U.T.C.C.R.) 1994 which is now 
replaced by the 1999 version. 
 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations  
(U.T.C.C.R.) 1999             
               These regulations were made on 22nd July 1999 and 
have come into force on first Oct. 1999. They revoked the 
Regulations of 1994 which bore the same title. They were 
issued in accordance with the European Communities Act 
1972.    
             The Explanatory Note attached to the Regulations 
provides that "The Regulations apply with certain exceptions, 
to unfair terms in contracts concluded between a consumer 
and a seller or supplier".  
     The (U.T.C.C.R.1999) are wider than both, their 
predecessor regulations and the Act, because they are 
 applicable to insurance contracts and transactions involving 
land whereas the formers are not. 
Definition of Consumer:    
               Regulation (3)(1) defines "consumer" as: "Any 
natural person who in contracts covered by these Regulations, 
is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or 
profession. 
     
Analysis of the Definition: 
 
---"Natural person": This excludes companies and all other 
juristic persons. The judicial precedents that happened to hold 
"companies" as "consumers" in certain cases are no longer 
good law in England. If a situation similar to that in   R. & B. 
Customs Brokers LTD 93  arises in England today, the position 
will be different on the ground that the plaintiffs are a 
company and as such not "consumers" within the meaning of 
the U.T.C.C.R. 1999.  
---"Contracts covered by these Regulations": Similar to their 
predecessor, these Regulations apply to "unfair terms". 
However, these are wider in that they apply to insurance 
contracts and transactions involving land. They are even wider 
than the Act in this respect. 
--- " Acting for purposes which are outside his trade business 
or profession":  In one case, 94 a car was bought with a view of 
being used partly for the business and partly for private use. It 
was held that the buyers were "consumers" since they were not 
in the business of buying cars.  
            It worth note that the Regulations define "unfair terms" 
in Para.(5) as " One which has not been individually 
negotiated and which, contrary to the requirements of good 
faith, causes significant imbalance in the parties rights and 
obligations under the contract to the detriment of the 
consumer."     
--- "Has not been individually negotiated":  
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            The Regulations also refer to "drafted in advance". This 
necessarily includes standard form contracts. According to the 
Regulations, the fact that a specific term or certain aspects of it 
have been individually  negotiated, does not exclude the 
application of the Regulations if an overall assessment of the 
contract indicates that it is nevertheless a pre-formulated 
standard contract. A certain aspect, e.g. the price, may 
particularly be negotiated. This does  not take the contract out 
of being " drafted in advance" within the meaning of the 
Regulations. 
 
Effect of Unfair terms 
 
Regulations (8) of the U.T.C.C.R.1999, provides:    
 (1)"An unfair term in a contract concluded with a consumer 
by a seller or supplier, shall not be binding on the consumer". 
 (2)"The contract shall continue to bind the parties if it is 
capable of continuing in existence without the unfair term."  
                  This means that terms judged as unfair are struck 
out. The rest of the contract, in principle, will be left in being 
unless the effect of striking out the unfair terms is to leave the 
contract of no sense.  
                  In Sudan, if a contract term proves to be " unfair" 
the court may, under section (120)(4), refuse to enforce it. The 
section does not empower the courts to modify the contract or 
the unfair terms. The power to modify unfair terms is 
guaranteed to Sudan courts by section (118) of the C.T.A. 
1984 where the contract is a contract of adhesion. Section 
(118) provides: 
               "In contracts of adhesion including unfair terms, the 
court may modify such terms or exempt the adhering party 
from them in accordance with the requirements of justice. Any 
agreement to the contrary shall be held void."  95 
               Section (118) has been introduced for the first time 
by the C.T.A. 1984. The repealed Contracts Act 1974 , did not 
adopt a similar provision. As will be discussed later, this may 
be attributed to the fact that standardization of contracts is a 
phenomenon of a relatively modern emergence in Sudan. 
 
                                                 
95 - An informal translation  
 The Future of Consumer Protection under English Law 
   
         The English and the Scottish Law Commissions have 
published a joint report on the law of unfair contract terms. 
96They recommended that the existing law be clarified. They 
found that the current law on unfair contract terms is hard to 
understand because it is contained in two different but 
overlapping pieces of legislation: The Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999. According to the Report, "Both of these are 
unnecessarily complicated, sometimes obscure and 
occasionally inconsistent."  
           A draft bill is attached to the Report intending to rewrite 
the existing law into a single, clear and accessible statute, 
while plugging some gaps in consumer protection. In 
particular the draft bill will: 
 
» Cover the whole range of terms currently covered by the 
Regulations. 
 
» Continue to hold that terms limiting the liability for death or 
personal injury, or excluding basic undertakings about quality 
or fitness of goods are ineffective. 
 
  » Cover negotiated clauses as well as standard clauses, and 
provide that in claims brought by consumers, the burden of 
proof lie on the business to show that the term is fair. 
 
» Include amendments that give more protection to vulnerable 
small businesses. In particular, it focuses on firms with nine or 
fewer staff in transactions that are not so large. 
 
        Being implemented, these recommendations will 
introduce drastic changes in English law. However, up to the 
end of the year 2007, the status quo is maintained and no 
further step was made. 
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 2\ The American System 
 
 
              The American concept of "contractual 
conscionability"   is a system of control strives for policing 
and monitoring contract terms whether statutorily or judicially. 
It is parallel to the system of prevention of "Unfair Contract 
Terms" as adopted in many common law jurisdictions. The 
American concept of "contractual conscionability" and its 
contrast with both Sudan and English law affords an important 
platform for examining the question of legal control to the use 
of "exemption" and "limitation" clauses.                     
               Literally, the word "unconscionable" means: "not 
guided or controlled by conscience", "unscrupulous", 
"excessively unreasonable",  " shockingly unfair or unjust". 
97This literal meaning is not far away from the technical legal 
use of the term. 
              Legally, the doctrine of contractual unconscionability 
allows courts to deny enforceability of unconscionable 
contracts or to modify unconscionable contract terms. 
Unconscionability arises in several scenarios: 98        
----Where a party that typically engages in sophisticated 
business transactions inserts standard terms (known in U.S.A. 
as boilerplate terms) into a contract and such terms are 
unlikely to be understood or appreciated by the average 
person. Such terms might include a disclaimer of warranties, 
or a provision extending liability for a newly purchased item to 
goods previously purchased from the same seller. 
----Where a seller offers in a contract of adhesion for the 
purchase of necessary goods or service e.g. food, water, means 
of transportation…etc. and that contract includes excluding or 
limiting terms.  
                                                 
97 -  Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.  
98 -  For full account of the topic see: Arthur Allen Leff, 
Unconscionability And The Code: The Emperor's New Clause,115 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 485(1967), . 
 
 » Where a seller is vastly inflating the price of goods, 
particularly where this inflation is conducted in a way that 
conceals from the buyer the total cost for which the buyer will 
be liable.  
          The earliest manifestations of the concept of 
"contractual unconscionability" are to be traced back to the 
year 1750 when an English court laid down the first reported 
attempt to define it. "Contractual unconscionability" was 
thought at that time to involve contracts "as no man in his 
senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, 
and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other." 99 
However, despite the English precedence in dealing with it, the 
concept of "contractual unconscionability" remained an infant 
in England. This may be attributed to the fact that the 
mechanism employed by the English system to control 
"exemption" and "limitation" clauses had developed along a 
statutory passage culminating in the present Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 coupled with the common law system of 
judicial control at the judicial level.                                                 
                             
         Unlike the English system, the American system had 
recognized the concept of "contractual unconscionability" in a 
relatively later stage. In 1951, the New York courts had, for 
the first time, introduced their formulation to the doctrine of 
contractual unconscionability".100 However, the doctrine has 
vigorously developed since then both at the legislative as well 
as the judicial levels. Now "contractual unconscionability" has 
become an elaborate doctrine in U.S.A. than it has ever been in 
any other comparative jurisdiction.   
          In 1951, the New York Court of Appeals declared that 
an unconscionable contract is one that is   "so grossly 
unreasonable or unconscionable in the light of the mores and 
business practices of the time and place as to be unenforceable 
according to its literal terms."101 
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           An important academic contribution to the doctrine was 
introduced by Professor Arthur Allen Leff, who suggested a 
two-step framework for any analysis. 102 First, the parties 
negotiate terms then they incorporate the final terms into a 
definite agreement. He characterized the first stage as 
procedural, the second as substantive. Using this approach, the 
courts sometimes identify offensive conduct during the first 
stage as being procedurally unconscionable. On the other 
hand, substantive terms are frequently referred to as being 
substantively unconscionable. However, these descriptions 
were said to have been " fall short in that they tell us where in 
the process the unconscionability is thought to have occurred. 
What is missing is any information about what makes the 
provision per se unconscionable".103                         
            A landmark in the evolution of the concept of 
contractual unconscionability was introduced in 1962 when 
the legislature attempted to include it in the New York 
commercial jurisprudence by passing section 2-302 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code(U.C.C.) to govern contracts of 
sale. The section provides:  
"(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time 
it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract , or it 
may enforce the remainder of contract without the 
unconscionable clause or it may so limit the application of any 
unconscionable clause  as to avoid any unconscionable 
result." 
"(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the 
contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable, the 
parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present 
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid 
the court in making the determination."  
          In 1967, a similar provision was enacted to govern real 
estate leases. Thus, section 235-c of the New York Real 
Property Law provides: 
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(1)" If the court as a matter of law finds a lease or any clause 
of the lease to have been unconscionable at the time it was 
made,  the court may refuse to enforce the lease, or it may 
enforce the remainder of the lease without the unconscionable 
clause or it may so limit the application  of any 
unconscionable clause  as  to avoid any unconscionable 
result." 
"(2)When it is claimed or appears to the court that a lease or 
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be 
afforded reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its 
setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the 
determination." 
 
The main pillars of the two sections are: 
 
* Procedurally:    Unconscionability may be pleaded before 
the court or  it may be raised by the court on its own motion. If 
so, the parties will be afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
present evidence. 
    
*Substantively:    The courts are empowered  to define and 
identify as a matter of law if contracts or leases, or their 
provisions, where unconscionable when made. 
 
*Effect:     Having decided that a clause is "unconscionable", 
the court may: 
a) Refuse to enforce the contract or lease ; or 
b) Enforce the remainder of the contract or lease without the 
unconscionable clause; or 
c) Limit the application of any unconscionable clause so as to 
avoid any  unconscionable result. 
         The legislative history of the UCC does provide a hint 
regarding what "unconscionability" was actually thought to 
involve. The draftsman of the UCC. declares:                     
"The basic test is whether, in the light of the general 
commercial background and the commercial needs of the 
particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided 
as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at 
the time of the making of the contract . The principle is one of 
 the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of the 
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior 
bargaining power."  104 
       The same is true as to the Real Property Law of 1976.  
Thus, in supporting the enactment, the Governor's message of 
approval stated: 
"Section 235-c of the Real Property Law, which will be added 
by this bill, is substantially similar to section 2-302 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. ……This principle of fairness and 
restraint, which has been applicable to the area of sales for 
sometime, should equally govern the conduct of the parties 
contemplating entering into the landlord and tenant 
relationship"  105 
    An American writer doubted whether these statutes 
contributed anything of substance. To him, "the litigants are 
told only that courts have the power to do what the legislature 
has failed to do, i.e. define and defeat unconscionability when 
and if they see it. This was a power the courts already 
possessed." 106 
The Judicial Position 
The role reserved for the American courts in the treatment of 
unconscionable contracts or unconscionable contract terms is 
extensive. It has two faces: 
First, their role according to the statutory provisions in what is 
known as the " statutory-cases". In this area, the courts are 
given the power to define, as a matter of law, what is 
unconscionable. Having done so, the courts have to tackle the 
question of enforceability.   
Second, their primary role in policing and monitoring 
unconscionability of contracts or contract terms in what is 
known as the "non-statutory cases". 
          According to Paul Bennett, "Given the failure of the 
legislature to define what is meant by unconscionability, the 
courts appear free to apply any equitable standard developed 
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 prior to the legislation together with whatever standards are 
developed thereafter."107 
           The attitude of the American courts in exercising their 
vast powers in both the "statutory cases" and the "non-
statutory cases" can be shown in the following judicial 
decisions:108 
1/ Universal Leasing Services Inco. V. Flushing Hae Kwan 
Restaurant    
             A consumer received a product that does not work. A 
clause disclaiming warranties barred him from a refund. It was 
held that there was exploitation and, consequently, the 
covenant was found "one-sided" and accordingly 
"unconscionable". 
2/ re Estate of Freidman 
        A party passed title to property in exchange for an open-
ended promise to pay at the option of the person receiving the 
property. That promise was found to be "one-sided" and was 
declared "unconscionable" accordingly. 
3/ Brower V. Gateway 200  Inco.  
               A contract included clauses requiring arbitration to 
take place in a foreign jurisdiction with no relationship with 
the subject matter of the contract or the parties thereto, and 
where the filing fees exceeded the amount of the substantive 
claim. The clauses where found "unconscionable".               
4/Sunbeam Farm Inco. V. Troche 
                A contract of sale left the agreement on the price 
blank. By a clause in the contract, the seller had the right to fill 
in any price he wished and whenever he wished. That clause 
was held to be one-sided and, hence, "unconscionable".  
               Equally important and informative are cases where 
the courts rebuff claims of "unconscionability". Thus, 
American courts did so in cases where:  
---The party defending on a claim of unconscionability has 
performed as required by the bargain and to that party's 
detriment.                                              
---The claim of unconscionability is founded solely upon an 
assertion of superior bargaining power in a contract that is 
otherwise commercially reasonable.              
                                                 
107 - Ibid  
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 ---A party has exchanged something of value for the waiver of 
a right.                 
---The party claiming unconscionability failed to negotiate the 
terms before  the agreement was signed.                                                              
      In one of its applications, the American principle of " 
contractual conscionability" cross-cuts  with the English 
principle of " adequacy of consideration". In English law, it 
was said: "It has been settled for well over three hundred years 
that the courts will not inquire into the ' adequacy of 
consideration'. 109 English courts are always adamant to this 
principle. To them, the parties are presumed capable of 
appreciating their own interests and of reaching their own 
equilibrium. In a case decided in 1587, it was held that "When 
a thing is to be done by the plaintiff, be it never so small, this 
is a sufficient consideration to ground an action". 110 A 
quantitative test has  never been recognized in English law, 
whereas the American principle of contractual conscionability 
can be invoked to denounce an agreement in which 
consideration proves to be inadequate where the court finds 
out that such inadequacy is either "oppressive" or  "one- sided" 
and as a result "unconscionable".  
           American courts enjoy a relatively wider scope of 
powers to investigate agreements and to adjust terms in order 
to guard against unconscionable contracts or contract terms. 
There are amble inroads for the American courts to interfere 
wherever the bargaining powers of the parties to a contract are 
unequal. 
            In Sudan, the position is now more or less similar to 
the American system since it has deviated from English law in 
1974 in the field of exemption and limitation clauses. Before 
1974, following English law, Sudan law afforded no room for 
questioning or investigating the comparative value of one 
party's promise and the act or promise given by the other party 
in exchange for it. That attitude of Sudan courts was severely 
criticized as being apt to produce unfair results.111 The 
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 criticism had paved the way for introducing restrictions on the 
freedom of the parties to agree on their own terms and to adopt 
a system of judicial control not dissimilar to the American. 
Section (52)(4) of the repealed Contracts Act 1974, had 
introduced, for the first time in Sudan, wide discretionary 
powers for the courts to refuse to enforce an "unjust" contract 
term. The same has been re-enacted in section(120)(4) of the 
present C.T.A. 1984  which was discussed at length in a 
preceding chapter.112 Strikingly, the concept of conscionability 
of contract was recognized by Sudanese courts at least in one 
occasion. In his judgment, Ramadan Ali Mohammad preferred 
the American approach and expressly criticized the English. 
The learned judge stated : 
"The problem raised by this new approach is that the courts 
must strike a balance between the freedom of contract, on the 
one hand, and the weak contractual position of an individual 
dealing with a monopoly or company, on the other. The 
individual dealing with a company or monopoly has usually no 
bargaining power and he must accept the terms imposed upon 
him, however unconscionable they are, or abandon the 
transaction altogether. Failure to help such an individual in 
such circumstances defeats justice in its wide sense."113  He 
then cited with approval  the words of Denning L.J.,  that," It 
is a serious question whether a contract In such wide terms 
would be enforced by the courts,” and added, " The vigilance 
of the common law which, while allowing freedom of the 
contract, watches to see that it is not abused.” However, that 
line of argument has been recognized only after some years 
later, firstly by the Contracts Act 1974, and now by the C.T.A. 
1984. It is now obvious that the concept of "unjust terms" as 
provided for in Sudan legislations, is comparable to the 
American concept of "Contractual Unconscionability". 
Moreover, Sudan courts now reserve the same discretion of the 
American courts in monitoring, policing and controlling 
"unjust" or "unconscionable" clauses . 114 
                                                 
112 - Chapter II above   
113 - Taha Mohammed Elrofai V. Provident Association  of Egypt, supra 
note 29,  
114 -Section (120)(4) of the C.T.A. 1984                                  
 Some Criticism to the Concept of Contractual 
Unconscionability 
            In spite of its apparent fairness the concept of 
contractual unconscionability was subjected to severe 
criticism not only by the English, but even by some American 
jurists. Thus, according to Spector–a notable American 
academic lawyer- the doctrine of unconscionability "involves a 
cluster of paternalistic restraints on freedom of contract" 115. 
This notion of "paternalism" is the corner stone in criticizing 
the doctrine of unconscionability. It was said that paternalism 
"directly expresses insufficient respect for the underlying 
valuable capacities, powers, and entitlements of the 
autonomous agent. Those who value equality and autonomy 
have special reasons to resist paternalism toward competent 
adults".116         
            In the light of the intensive criticism directed to the 
doctrine of unconscionability, a number of proposals for 
reform were made. The most influential was introduced by the 
American Seana Shiffrin. She proposes a "self-regarding" 
theory for unconscionability in order to free the doctrine from 
any paternalistic dimension for which it has been stigmatized. 
According to this view, the state, via the courts, should not 
enforce private agreements whereby one party exploits or 
takes unfair advantage of the other. Shiffrin claims that:                    
     "The state has at least permission and perhaps a 
deontological commitment not to assist grossly unfair 
treatment of one of its citizens by another. Even if the 
abandonment of the unconscionability doctrine would be more 
efficient and might enable more generous redistribution, there 
would still be reason to refuse to insert the state's power 
between citizens to assist exploitive behaviour."117 However, 
this view was in its turn criticized. It was criticized on the 
ground that it only conceives of the passive role of 
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 nonintervention, that is, refusal to enforce. It does not address 
cases where the courts intervene to redress unfairness by 
modifying the terms of an agreement. Moreover, it does not 
apply in cases of the so-called "procedural unconscionability" 
i.e. unconscionability arising in the process of formation of the 
contract thereby producing a vitiating element.  
               It is now clear that the scope of the courts' powers in 
refusing to enforce or modify an unconscionable contract vary 
from one legal system to another. It is further clear that such a 
scope is relatively wider in Sudan and American law than the 
English counterpart. However, the attitude of Sudan courts in 
exercising their statutory powers to refuse to enforce unjust 
terms, is less clear than the attitude of the American and the 
English courts .This may be attributed to certain socio-
economic factors viz. The relative commercial unawareness 
and, it is submitted, the reluctance of Sudanese people to 
resort to litigation for settling their disputes created paucity of 
judicial literature. The insufficiency of academic writings in 
Sudan is a further negative factor. These realities elevate the 
importance of the comparative handling and the foreign 
experience to fill in the gaps thereby building up a legal 
regime at once fair and efficient for the treatment of 
exemptions and limitation clauses.  
 Chapter IV 
 
Matters Related to Exemption and Limitation 
Clauses 
 
Interpretation of Exemption and Limitation Clauses- Contracts 
of Adhesion--Fundamental Breach 
 
 (1) Interpretation of Exemption and Limitation 
Clauses 
 
             Having established that an exemption or a limitation 
clause is effectively incorporated into the contract, and that no 
overriding statutory provision is applicable, the question will 
be: What is the exact meaning of the clause? Does it cover the 
liability it purports to exclude or limit?  To what extent?                                    
            These are the questions of interpretation and 
construction posed by exemption and limitation clauses. A 
wide range of general interpretation rules guide the courts in 
their unenviable task of interpreting a contract, which is, on 
the face of it, ambiguous. Moreover, some special rules are 
specifically designed for these clauses. The vast majority of 
such rules are evolved by courts while others _though 
currently statutorily recognized _may owe their origins to 
some judicial background. 
             In Sudan, section (56) of the repealed Contracts Act 
1974, is an example of the statutory provision of interpretation 
rules. It laid down rules by way of "canons of construction" to 
guide the courts. The present C.T.A. 1984 provides for 
elaborate interpretation rules imported mainly from Jordanian 
law as it will be discussed below. The Act sets forth Chapter 
(12) of Part II, sections (96-101) –inclusively– for rules of 
interpretation of contracts. These rules are generally applicable 
in interpreting exemption or limitation clauses, which are, 
moreover, subjected to special rules of interpretation by the 
same Act. 
            The scenarios recognized by Sudan law and similar 
systems in the enforcement of contracts and the interpretation 
of contract terms, can be wrapped up as follows:                                                
             The exact words used by the parties are the first 
reference for ascertaining the terms of a contract. If the 
wording of the contract is clear, its words must be upheld. A 
court should not try to re-write a contract by deviating from 
the words used by the parties via interpretation rules. 
However, if the wording of the contract, on the face of it, is 
not availing, the court has to discover the intention of the 
contracting parties using the plain, ordinary and   popular 
meanings of the words to pinpoint the intentions of the parties 
at the moment of contracting. If this is not availing too, the 
court has to apply the rules of interpretation as a last resort.  
              
The C.T.A 1984. provides: 
  
 (i)  "Where the wording of the contract is clear, it must not be 
deviated from, by way of construction, to discover the intention 
of the parties".118 
 
(ii) " Where there is room for interpretation, the intention of 
the parties must be ascertained without sticking to the literal 
meaning of the words, and in the light of the nature of the 
transaction and the requirements of honesty  and trust between 
the parties according to the current customs" . 
 
(iii) "Any doubt must be resolved in favour of the party against 
whom the term is pleaded, nevertheless ambiguous terms in 
contracts of adhesion must not be interpreted in  a way 
detrimental to the adhering party".119                 
                  It worth note that the C.T.A. 1984, has followed in 
this respect the approach followed in most Arab jurisdictions. 
These two sections of the C.T.A.1984 are identical with the 
Jordanian Civil Code sections (239) and (240), the Syrian 
Civil Code sections (151) and (152) and the Algerian Civil 
Code sections (111) and (112). They all derive from the 
French civil Code particularly section (1162). However, the 
common law of Sudan before 1974 was also identical to the 
position of the C.T.A1984, and it is, hence, difficult to ascribe 
it to either of them. 
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                  In the case of : Dombrower and Co. V. Elsayed 
Khalil Yacoub 120 
           Babiker Awadalla, C.J. applied the statement of the rule 
as embodied by the present Section (101)(1) when he quoted 
Lord Hatherley in one English case, that: 
          "If the words have a certain definite meaning it is 
dangerous to depart from the meaning until you can arrive at 
any sound ground upon which you should do so." 
           Again, Section (102) of the C.T.A1984 , does not lack a 
similar Sudanese root. It was held in the case of: Mansour  
Hussein V. Anglo American Nile co 121 that:  " The rule that 
words are to be construed most strongly against  him who uses 
them applied only when there is doubt as to the meaning." 
             The consistency of the present statement of Sudan law 
with its position before 1984 is in line with the consistency 
between the position of common law jurisdictions and the 
French and Arabs' approaches.   In Scott v. Wawanesa Mutual 
Insurance Co., a majority of Canada's Supreme Court held 
that: 
"... when the wording is clear and unambiguous, courts should 
not give it a meaning different from that which is expressed by 
its clear terms, unless the contract is unreasonable or has an 
effect contrary to the intention of the parties."  122                                               
                  It is universally agreed that if after attempting to 
construe an exemption or a limitation clause (or indeed any 
other contractual term) in accordance with the ordinary or 
natural meaning of the words there is still ambiguity, then the 
rules of construction come into play. 
The Contra proferentum Rule 
 
                The oft-cited "Contra proferentum" rule at common 
law leads to the same result to which section (102) of the 
C.T.A 1984 and its Arab counterparts lead. However, the 
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 scope of the statutory version of the rule in English law is 
narrower because it is confined only to "consumers".123  
                 "Contra proferentum" literally means "against the 
offerror". 124 The full maxim reads:  "Verba fortius accipuntur 
contra proferentum." 
                    In the field of contract law, the "Contra 
proferentum"   rule provides that where terms of a contract are 
ambiguous, the terms are to be construed against the party who 
imposed the inclusion of the ambiguous terms i.e. against the 
drafter of the contract. The rule is  justified on two overlapping 
grounds: 
----To guard against one party benefiting from its own made 
uncertainty; 
----To protect the weaker party in the bargaining powers. 
                   In the field of insurance law it was held in England 
that : 
   "Clauses in insurance policy providing coverage are 
interpreted liberally or broadly in favour of the insured and 
those clauses excluding coverage are construed strictly 
against the insurer" 125. 
                  American courts in the same field of insurance law 
acknowledged, "There is an unresolved question whether the 
rule of contra proferentum is even applicable in a situation 
involving a large, sophisticated, counseled entity." 126 That is 
the situation where the party dealing with an insurance 
company is a "sophisticated" party and it has negotiated the 
terms of the policy of insurance with the insurance company 
before signing. It is submitted that the two grounds on which 
the "contra proferentum" rule is based, are lacking in the 
situation in question. The fact that the terms are already 
negotiated by the parties makes them equally "drafters", and 
that there is no weaker party as far as the party dealing with 
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 the insurance company is "sophisticated".  However, the issue 
remains unsettled in American law up two the year 2006. 127  
           The following two judicial decisions cast some light on 
the attitude of Sudan courts toward interpreting exemption and 
limitation clauses. 
Abdel Gadir El Baloula V. El Saggay Agricultural Scheme 
128  
           The defendants agreed to irrigate the plaintiff's land. At 
the time when the contract was made, the defendants had two 
working engines. The contract contained a clause which said" 
Abdel Gadir El Baloula will have no right to claim 
compensation if the engine breaks down or incapacitated". In 
the course of the performance of the contract a sandy island 
blocked the channels from which one of the engines was 
drawing its water and the defendants failed to supply the 
plaintiff with the water he needed. The plaintiff's crop died as 
a result of lack of water. As a defence to the plaintiff's action 
for breach of contract, the defendants pleaded the exemption 
clause. 
             The Court of Appeals refused to accept this defence. 
In his judgment Abu Rannat C.J. stated: 
       " In their written agreement the words used are, ' if the 
engine is incapacitated.' The agreement did not say that if an 
island or some other cause interfered with the watering the 
defendant should be liable." 
             The Court of Appeals interpreted the word 
incapacitated to mean physical incapacity of the engine itself. 
This restricted interpretation was intended to serve the 
plaintiffs, being the party against whom the exemption clause 
was pleaded. However, a different conclusion was reached to 
in the context of interpreting the word "loss" in the Railways 
Regulations. The ambiguity was resolved in favour of the 
Railways which drafted the clause. Thus in the case of: 
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 Chotalal Vithaldes V. Sudan Railways 129  
              The question was whether or not the word "loss" in 
Sudan Railways Corporation Regulations includes willful 
misconduct of the Railways employees. The court adopted a 
broad meaning and upheld the railways defence despite the 
fact that it was the party that drafted and pleaded the clause. 
This decision was criticized by Dr. Zaki in his view that: " 
Despite the fact that the learned judge started by saying that 
the principle of construction to be employed was ' to narrow 
than to broaden the apparent scope of the words', he has 
certainly gone out of his way to broaden the scope of the 
words as much as it can ever be broaden." 130  
            Concerning English law, the following judicial 
decisions reflect the attitude of the English courts toward 
interpreting ambiguous exemption and limitation clauses. 
Lee (John) & Son (Grantham) Ltd. V Railway Executive   
131 
         The plaintiffs leased a warehouse from the defendants. In 
the lease was a clause purporting to exempt from liability ' for 
loss or damage (Whether by the act or negligent of the 
company or their servants or agents or not) which but for the 
tenancy hereby created….. would not have arisen.' Goods in 
the warehouse were damaged by fire owing to the alleged 
negligence of the defendants in allowing a spark or some such 
combustible matter to escape from their railway engines. The 
exemption clause, though capable of bearing a wider 
interpretation, was construed by the Court of Appeal against 
the landlord. The words "but for the tenancy hereby created" 
were interpreted by the court to restrict the exemption only to 
liabilities which arose only by reason of the relationship of 
landlord and tenant created by the lease. 
        In another, Wallis, Son & Wells V Pratt, 132  the plaintiff 
purchased from the defendant certain seed described as 
'common English sainfoin'. The seed was in fact a different 
lower quality seed known as 'giant sainfoin'. The contract 
contained a clause excluding liability for breach of all 
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 warranties, whether express or implied. The defendant, of 
course, was in breach of a condition implied by section 13 of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1893 requiring the goods to correspond 
to their description. The House of Lords held that the sellers 
disentitled from reliance on the clause: Conditions are 
something else than warranties. 
         Webster V Higgins  133 
               A term in a hire purchase contract provided that 'no 
warranty. Condition or description is given'. It was held that 
the use of the word is does not exclude liability for an 
undertaking which had previously been given. 
 
  Houghton V Trafalgar Insurance   134  
            A motor insurance policy provided that the insurer was 
not to be liable ' whilst the car is carrying any load in excess of 
that for which it was constructed'. The car carried an excess of 
passengers. It was held that passengers were not embraced by 
the term load. 
 
 
 
 (2) Standard Form Contracts 
And Contracts of Adhesion 
   
 
            A "Standard form contract" is a pre-established record 
of legal terms regularly used by a business entity or firm in 
dealing with customers. The oft-cited statement of Lord 
Diplock in Schroeder Music Publishing Co. LTD V. 
Macaulay135, distinguishes between two types of this form of 
contracts as follows: 
 
          "Standard form of contracts is of two kinds. The first, of 
very ancient origin, are those, which set out the terms on 
which mercantile transactions of common occurrence are to 
be carried out. Examples are bills of lading, charterparties, 
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 policies of insurance, and contracts of sale in the commodity 
markets. The standard clauses in these contracts have been 
settled over the years by negotiations by representatives of the 
commercial interests involved and have been widely adopted 
because experience has shown that they facilitate the conduct 
of trade. Contracts of these kinds affect not only the actual 
parties to them but also others who may have commercial 
interest in the transactions to which they relate, as buyers or 
sellers, charterers or shipowners, insurers or bankers. If 
fairness or reasonableness were relevant to their 
enforceability the fact that they are widely used by parties 
whose bargaining power is fairly matched could raise a strong 
presumption that their terms are fair and reasonable.      
            The same presumption, however does not apply to the 
other kind of standard form of contact. This is of 
comparatively modern origin. It is the result of the 
concentration of particular kinds of business in relatively few 
hands. the tickets cases in the 19 th century provide what are 
probably the first examples. The terms of this kind of standard 
form of contract have not been the subject of negotiation 
between the parties to it, or approved by any organization 
representing the interests of the weaker party. They have been 
dictated by that party whose bargaining power, either 
exercised alone or in conjunction with others providing 
similar goods or services, enable him to say: ' If you want 
these goods or services at all, these are the only terms on 
which they are obtainable. Take it or leave it.'                                                     
            "Standard form contracts" as an increasingly growing 
phenomenon of the contemporary market, are backed by two 
factors:  
First,  the prevalence of economies of mass production and 
vast distribution, in which it is impracticable- if not 
impossible- for a producer to negotiate the conditions of every 
contract with whomsoever purchases its commodity or deals in 
its service. 
Second, consumers' behaviour focuses on price, quality and 
appearance of the goods rather than negotiating the detailed 
terms. 
         The use of "Standard form contracts" achieves two 
objectives: Reduction of cost of production and saving of time 
 and efforts, which may otherwise be exerted in a needless 
bargaining process. 
         In Sudan, the emergence of the phenomenon of standard 
form contracts is to be traced back to the first half of the 
preceding century as evidenced by the contracts  prepared by 
the then Sudan Light and Power Company for the supply of 
electricity to its customers and the Railways Corporation 
contracts which first version of regulations were passed in 
1914. The phenomenon, in Sudan and everywhere, is rapidly 
increasing. Writing in 1971 in U.S.A., Slawson noticed:  
            "Standard form contracts probably account for more 
than ninety-nine percent of all contracts now made." 136    
  
Despite the fact that standard form contracts is a phenomenon 
known in Sudan almost a century ago, it was, not until 
recently, a dominating phenomenon. This explains the absence 
of statutory provisions specifically designed for this type of 
contracts. The Contracts Act 1974 did not make special 
reference to them. They were then treated in accordance with 
the general provisions, which happened to govern contracts 
generally. However, the present C.T.A. 1984 has dealt with 
them in the context of the prevalence of added terms over 
original terms. The Act provides in section (121) that: 
            (In contracts entered into by signing standard form 
contracts, which are used for the unification of contractual 
relations, and in case of inconsistency between the original 
standardized terms and the subsequently added terms, the later 
shall prevail.)               
        Applied to exemption and limitation clauses embodied in 
a standard form contract, if such clauses are not originally 
there and they are belatedly added to the contract, they will be 
binding on the parties even if they are inconsistent with the pr-
existing standard terms. On the other hand, if such clauses are 
originally part of the standard terms and they have been 
quashed or a provision excluding them is added subsequently, 
they will not be binding on the parties even if they are not 
deleted. 
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           The C.T.A.1984, has tacitly provided for the object of 
using standard form contracts by describing them as " which 
are used for the unification of contractual relations" 137.The 
commonest examples of Standard form contracts are those 
relating to the supply of services such as electricity, water, 
insurance, telephone, rail or air transportation and carriage of 
goods. 
                      
 
Contracts of Adhesion 
        
          "Contracts of adhesion", sometimes referred to as 
"adhesion contracts" 138 is a fertile area for exemption and 
limitation clauses. This type of contracts belongs to a family of 
concepts imported to Sudan mainly from some Arab countries. 
The C.T.A 1984, has provided—for the first time in Sudan—in 
sections (45), (102) (118) for this type of contract. The 
Contracts Act 1974 did not devote special treatment to this 
type of contracts. Like all kinds of standard form contracts, 
they were then governed by the general rules provided by the 
Act for contracts generally. The French system is the homeland 
of the concept of "Contracts of adhesion" from where the Arab 
systems derived. The French philosopher Raymond Saleilles 
was the first to coin the term "adhesion contracts". 139 
Referring to this type of contracts Cheshire stated: 
     "The French though not the English lawyers have a name 
for it". 140 
 Cheshire quoted Kessler that, 
     "The term contract d'adhesion is employed to denote the 
type of contract of which the conditions are fixed by one of the 
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an innovation of the Egyptian jurist  al Sanhury in his book: alWasseet, 
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139 -Mukafahat al Shorout al Ta'asofia fi al Uqud,(Prevention of Unfair 
Terms in Contracts), Dr. Bodally Mohamad, Dar al Fajr, , P.9, a 
comparative study in Arabic published in 2007  
140 -Cheshire, supra note 8, at P.22                                         
 parties in advance and are open to acceptance by anyone. The 
contract, which frequently contains many conditions is 
presented for acceptance en bloc and is not open to 
discussion".141 The second part of Lord Polock statement 
referred to above relates to this type of contracts. 
           It was said that the concept of adhesion contracts did 
not enter American jurisprudence "until the Harvard Law 
Review published an influential article by Edwin W. Patterson 
in 1919". It was further said that the concept "was 
subsequently adopted by the majority of American courts, 
especially after the Supreme Court of California endorsed 
adhesion analysis in 1962 in Steven V. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 
". 142 
  American courts have evolved the essential elements of 
contracts of adhesion as follows: 
 (i) The contract is presented to the public on standardized, 
printed form. 
(ii) Offered on a take it or leave it basis or, 
(iii) Purchasers do not have an opportunity to negotiate any of 
the terms because of unequal bargaining power.  
             The C.T.A 1984 does not define the expression:  
"contract of adhesion". However, it lays down certain rules 
applicable to it. Section (45) provides for the rules of 
acceptance with special reference to "contract of adhesion", 
section (102) provides for its interpretation whereas section 
(118) provides for the discretionary powers of the courts to 
strike down or to modify unfair terms in contracts of adhesion. 
The first section is of little relevance to the subject matter of 
this work, the second was discussed above whereas the third, 
section 118 provides a supplement to the provision in section 
(120) (4). Both sections intend to guard against unfair use of 
contract terms be they exemption clauses or otherwise. Section 
(118) is applicable irrespective of a contrary agreement by the 
parties i.e. the parties cannot exclude it. The section empowers 
the court to set aside unfair terms in contracts of adhesion. It is 
similar to the provision of section (158) which renders illegal 
any agreement purports to exempt a party to a contract from 
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 tortious liability.143Both sections do not recognize the doctrine 
of party autonomy according to which the parties can 
consensually exclude the applicability of a legal provision.  
      The use of contracts of adhesion was and is always the 
subject of severe criticism.  In U.S.A., the oft-cited article of 
Professor Kessler represents an opposing view to the use of 
this type of contracts. He scathingly criticized contracts of 
adhesion employing language more suitable for political 
propaganda than for detached legal analysis. Kessler stated 
that this type of contracts "enables powerful and commercial 
overlords to impose a new feudal order of their own making 
upon a vast host of vassals." 144 
        Despite the criticism directed to the use of contracts of 
adhesion in U.S.A. and many other jurisdictions, they do not 
lack support. The same justifications backing the use of 
standard form contracts are necessarily true as to adhesion 
contracts viz. Reduction of cost and saving of time and efforts. 
Further, unfairness of contract terms is curtailed in different 
ways whether statutory or judicial. Has an exemption or a 
limitation clause proved to be unfair for a reason or another,  
different grounds can be invoked by the aggrieved party to 
attack the enforceability of  that clause. Where the alleged 
unfairness is due to an inequality of bargaining powers, the 
general principles of contract law afford sufficient resort. 
Thus, an Arab magazine in the editorial note stated:  
    ﻱﺫـﻟﺍ ﺭﺨﻵﺍ ﺩﻗﺎﻌﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﺩﻬﻌﺘﻭ ﻥﻴﺩﻗﺎﻌﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﺩﺤﺍ ﺩﻬﻌﺘ ﻥﻴﺒ لﺩﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﻲﻓ لﻼﺘﺨﻻﺍ ﻥﺍ
 ،لـﻁﺎﺒ ﺩﻘﻌﻟﺎﻓ ﻥﻴﺩﻗﺎﻌﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﺩﺤﺍ ﻪﻔﺴﺒ ﻡﻠﻌﻟﺍ لﻭﺼﺤ ﻰﻟﺍ ﻯﺩﺍ ﻥﺍ لﻼﻐﺘﺴﻻﺎﺒ ﻰﻤﺴﻴ
 ﻰـﻟﺍ ﺎـﻴﺩﺅﻤ لﻼﺘﺨﻻﺍ ﻥﻜﻴ ﻡﻟ ﻥﺍﻭ ،ﻲﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﺩﻗﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﻪﻴﻠﻋ ﺭﻭﺠﺤﻤ ﻪﻴﻔﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻻ
 ﺍ ﻥﺎﻜ ﻥﺎﻓ ،ﻥﻴﺩﻗﺎﻌﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﺩﺤﺍ ﻪﻔﺴﺒ ﻡﻠﻌﻟﺍ لﻭﺼﺤ لﺼﺤﻓ ﺔﻤﻴﻘﻟﺎﺒ ﻼﻫﺎﺠ ﻥﻴﺩﻗﺎﻌﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﺩﺤ
 ﻼﺼﺍ ﺭﺎﻴﺨ ﻪﻟ ﺱﻴﻠﻓ ﻥﺒﻐﻟﺎﺒ ﺎﻤﻟﺎﻋ ﻥﺎﻜ ﻥﺍﻭ ،ﻁﻘﻓ ﻥﺒﻐﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻴﺨ ﺕﺒﺜﻴﻓ لﻼﺘﺨﻻﺍ ﺍﺫﻫ
ﻥﺎﻋﺫﻻﺍ ﺩﻭﻘﻋ ﻲﻓ ﻭﻫ ﺎﻤﻜ ﺩﻘﻌﻟﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻴﻔﺴﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﻁﻭﺭﺸﻟﺍﻭ لﻼﻐﺘﺴﻻﺍ لﺼﺤ ﻥﺍﻭ.145  
      Having concluded that the use of contracts of adhesion is 
an inevitable matter, the Islamic Jurisprudence International 
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 Council (I.J.I.C.) of the Islamic Conference Organization 
(I.C.O.) in its 14th  session in Doha Qatar on 16 January 2003 
passed a Resolution holding, inter alia, that : 
          " As far as it is probable for the stronger party to 
control both the contract price and the contract terms in 
contracts of adhesion in a way prejudicial to the other party or 
to the public at large, contracts of adhesion must  be  
monitored by the  State with a view to approve fair contracts 
and to modify or cancel contracts which are prejudicial to the 
adhering party in accordance with the demands of justice 
based on Sharia.''146       
           The Sudanese experience knew different kinds of 
contracts of adhesion used by a number of firms. Such firms 
provide different services or commodities to the public based 
on standardized instruments qualifying as contracts of 
adhesion. The commonest are those used by Sudan Railways 
Corporation, 147 Sudan Airways Corporation, the Public 
Electricity Corporation, the telecommunication 
companies….... etc. In all these instances, exemption and 
limitation clauses are constantly incorporated.   
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 (3) Fundamental Breach 
 
       It finally remains to see whether a "fundamental breach" 
by one party to a contract is apt to deprive that party from the 
protection embodied in an exemption or a limitation clause, 
what is and, was, the position of Sudan law in now and then? 
The concept of "fundamental breach" and its effect on the 
enforceability of exemption and limitation clauses and, on the 
entire contract under the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods   CISG) 
       The position of Sudan law toward the doctrine of 
fundamental breach and its effect on the enforceability of 
exemption and limitation clauses is discussed hereunder in a 
historical sequence i.e. following the orthodox  phase-
classification of : Before 1974, the period 1974-1984 and the 
period from 1984 to date.  
       The first case on the point decided before 1974 was: 
 Mikhail Haggar and Limnios Bros. V. Sudan Railways  148  
The plaintiffs delivered certain goods for transport by the 
defendant up to the White Nile. The goods where loaded on 
two barges containing huge quantities of benzene and 
petroleum. Before the start of the journey up river, the benzene 
exploded and the goods were destroyed. The goods were 
accepted for carriage at owners' risk. The owners' risk note 
was a standardized clause incorporated, by reference, wide 
exemption and limitation provisions into the contract of 
carriage set out in the Railways( Carriage and Storage) 
Regulations 1914. The High Court decided that the defendants 
by loading dangerous goods with the goods of the plaintiffs 
have failed to observe a material condition of the contract and 
therefore unable to avail themselves of the protection afforded 
by the Owners' Risk clause and the exemption provision 
therein. However, the learned judge of the High Court used " 
material condition” and not "fundamental obligation". This 
raised the question whether Sudan law, at that time, recognized 
a rule wider than the rules applied by the English courts? This 
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 question is backed by the fact that breach of a material term is 
much less serious than breach of a  fundamental obligation. 
According to Prof. Zaki Mustafa,  " the answer must be in the 
negative for two reasons : 
(a) The violation in the present case was sufficiently serious 
to answer the description of a fundamental obligation and not 
merely a material term, and 
(b) At the time when this case was decided the doctrine was 
still in its very early infancy and no standard terminology had 
been devised whether here or in England." 149 
          When the case was argued before the Court of Appeal, 
the three judges unananimously upheld the decision of the 
judge of the High Court. The then Chief Justice stated: " 
Moreover a general clause exempting a carrier from liability 
does not put an end to the carrier's obligation to perform his 
contract. He must carry his contract before he can claim the 
protection of the special exception" 
              In a subsequent decision, the dicta of Babiker 
Awadalla, C.J., threw more light on the point as follows: 
         "It is true that in England there is a growing tendency to 
by-pass exclusion clauses of this type in certain cases, e.g. 
Karsales ( Harrow )LTD V. Wallis, [1956]2  All E. R. 866, but 
the rule referred to is restricted in its operation to cases where 
the owner has been guilty of a breach of any of his obligations 
that go to the root of the contract."150   
In line with this dicta came the decision in : 
EL Rashid Hamza Koko V. Kamal Khalafalla 151 
        The plaintiff in this case is suing to recover from the 
defendant the sum of £S.100 paid by him for the purchase of a 
refrigerator according to the contract. The plaintiff alleges that 
he has found the refrigerator completely useless and he had 
adduced evidence to that effect. The defendants, on the other 
hand, pleaded that even if the refrigerator is as bad as the 
                                                 
149 - Zaki Mustafa, Supra note 3, at  P 159                                                            
150 -  Sudan Mercantile co (Motors) LTD V. Abdel Karim Beshir Mustafa 
& Others, unreported  Decision - AC – REV – 416 – 1964.  
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 plaintiff alleges, they are wholly protected by the exemption 
contained in clause 6 of the written “Contract of Purchase by 
Hire.”(sic) 
The learned District Judge stated:  
" The defect in the refrigerator complained of by the plaintiff, 
as it has been satisfactorily proved to me, is so grave that it 
can safely be said to be out of the ambit of the contract 
altogether, because the refrigerator proved to be nothing more 
than an unsatisfactory ice-box. Such defect underlies the whole 
contract; if the defendant failed to perform his main obligation 
of the contract, i.e., providing the plaintiff with a refrigerator, 
he cannot be heard to plead one of the clauses of the contract" 
.              
               However, in at least three occasions of contracts of 
carriage of goods, the goods were lost in transitu, nevertheless 
defendant carrier benefited from an exemption clause 
incorporated in the contracts by reference. Definitely, 
defendant committed a fundamental breach. Its primary 
obligation to deliver the goods to destiny was not carried out. 
These are : 
1-  Saad El Tayeb V. Sudan Railways 152 
20 sacks out of an owners' risk consignment of 220 sacks of 
grain were lost between Hag Abdalla and Port Sudan, while 
carried in an open wagon. Both the District Court and the High 
Court decided that the owners' risk clause sufficiently 
protected the Railways. 
2- Abdo Rabu Ali El Himeidi V. Sudan Railways 153 
               9 sacks of dura out of an  owners' risk consignment 
of 100 sacks were  lost between Jebel Moya and Dogola, while 
carried in an open wagon. Again, both the District Court and 
the High Court decided that the owners' risk clause sufficiently 
protected the Railways. 
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 3- Abbas Abu Mirein V. Sudan Railways 154 
             A consignment of 3 sacks of coffee beans sent at 
owners' risk lost 32 kilos en route. The court decided that the 
owners' risk clause effectively barred the owner from 
recovering anything. 
           The Contracts Act 1974 provided the first statutory 
treatment to the issue of fundamental breach in Sudan. 
However, throughout the period during which that Act was in 
force, no single judicial authority can be traced. Section 
(52)(4) of that Act provided:          
     "In all cases the Court may whenever it is satisfied that it is 
necessary to do so, refuse to enforce any exemption or 
limitation term ..………. if that term deprives such party of the 
rights which he contracted to enjoy''.                       
        Besides adopting the same provision of the repealed 
Contracts Act 1974 referred to above, the C.T.A.1984, has 
dealt with the question of "breach of contract" within the 
context of " discharge of contract" : Discharge by breach. 
Section (128)(1) avails the aggrieved party with two options in 
case the contract was breached by the other party: 
a) To claim specific performance; or 
b) To repudiate the contract. 
              However, as a pre-requisite for enjoying any of these 
options, the aggrieved party must make a formal demand to the 
party in breach to correct its position. The terminology used by 
the C.T.A. 1984 is the so-called ( Eazzaar ) which is 
equivalent to the French ( mise en demeure). This is another 
area of contract law in which Sudan law makes a departure 
from its pre-existing position favouring the position of some 
Arab jurisdictions particularly the Jordanian and the Syrian. 
Section (128) of the C.T.A. 1984 is completely identical with 
Section ( 158 ) of the Syrian Civil Code. They all derive from 
French law and its inherent policy namely, to preserve the 
enforceability of the contract whenever feasible. This is clear 
from the requirement that the aggrieved party must make a 
formal demand to the seller to cure         (Eazzaar), the 
discretionary powers of the court to provide the party in breach 
additional period of performance (128)(2), and the 
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 discretionary powers to reject the termination of the contract 
where the breach is only minor. 
            Sub-section (1) of Section (128) refers to a breach of 
an obligation. The sub-section does not distinguish between 
fundamental and non-fundamental breach. Such distinction is 
recognized by Sub-section (2) of the same section. It provides 
for the wide discretionary powers of the court to : 
a) Specify an extended performance date; or 
b) Reject repudiation of the contract where the breach 
complained of is only minor.   
       Only within these two cases, the issue of the gravity of the 
breach is of relevance. As far as the courts are empowered to 
reject repudiation of the contract where the breach complained 
of is minor or non-fundamental, it follows by subtraction that 
where the breach is fundamental the court has no such 
discretion. It has to order specific performance or repudiation 
of the contract. This means that under the rules of contract law 
now in force in Sudan, the notion of fundamental breach is 
recognized. It is an overriding factor against the protection of 
exemption or limitation clauses, which may be otherwise 
available for a party who is in breach of a contractual 
obligation. The contract being repudiated, there will be no 
room for pleading an exemption or any contractual term. 
Unfortunately, the position of the C.T.A. 1984, is to be studied 
only theoretically at the abstract statutory level only in the 
absence of any reported judicial decision to support an 
empirical study. Section (120)(4), is a further statutory basis 
introducing an overriding effect of  fundamental breach. This 
can be inferred from the proviso that: "In all cases the Court 
may whenever it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so, refuse 
to enforce any exemption or limitation term which 
………deprives such party of the rights which he contracted to 
enjoy"  
 
The Notion of Fundamental Breach under the CISG 
              The United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
International Sale of Goods (CISG), sometimes referred to as, 
the Vienna Sales Convention is said to be "One of the most 
 successful examples of unification in the area of commercial 
international law". 155 Unfortunately, neither Sudan nor any of 
the Arab countries , except Egypt, have acceded to the 
convention. Consequently, the present analysis is a hint 
intended to provide -exclusively- an insight into the notion of 
fundamental breach and the effect, thereof on the 
enforceability of  exemption and limitation clauses . 
            The concept of fundamental breach is said to be " a 
milestone concept” of the (CISG).156 Article (25) of the 
Convention states that: " A  breach of contract committed by 
one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such detriment 
to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is 
entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in 
breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same 
kind in the same circumstances would have not foreseen such 
a result." This provision was criticized "because it does not 
give a clear definition of fundamental breach." 157 
Under the convention, a fundamental breach by the seller 
entitles the buyer to : 
a ) avoid the contract ( art. 49 (1)(a) and 64(1)(a) or ; 
b ) claim delivery of substitute goods (art. 46(2). 
C ) claim damages (art. 70  
                Controversy exists on whether defects can be cured 
by the seller before the buyer can declare the contract avoided 
i.e. a correction by the buyer prior to the seller's purport 
repudiation deprives the buyer of its right to terminate, claim 
substitute goods or to claim damages. Again, it must be 
established if the offer by the seller to replace or repair the 
defective goods may halt the effects of the buyer's declaration 
of avoidance. (The convention uses avoidance in contrast to 
repudiation). 
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                In two aspects of breach of contracts; the question of 
"fundamental breach" is more frequent: Late performance and 
delivery of defective goods. The Convention devotes a 
considerable portion of its provisions to handle these issues. In 
the field of exemption clauses, assuming that a seller exempts 
itself from liability toward delivery of defective goods, 
assuming further that the seller, having delivered defective 
goods, pleaded the exemption clause: A position similar to that 
in the Sudanese case of   ElRashid Hamza Koko158, what will 
the position be? What about a buyer's contention based on 
fundamental breach ? What about the seller's counter-claim to 
deliver substitute goods?  
        In that case, the Plaintiff bought a new refrigerator from 
the defendant, and signed a document called “Contract of 
Purchase”.(sic) Clause (6) stated that no guarantee as to the 
merchantability, fitness for any purpose or otherwise was to be 
implied. The refrigerator was completely defective. The 
Plaintiff sued defendant for the return of the price paid. 
Defendant relied in his defence on clause (6) of the “Contract 
of Purchase.” It was held that: 
(A seller of goods who is sued by the buyer for breach of an 
implied warranty of fitness for the buyer’s purpose cannot rely 
on an exemption clause in a written contract signed by the 
buyer which excludes such terms from being implied into the 
contract, where the breach of the implied warranty of fitness is 
so great as to amount to a fundamental breach of the seller’s 
whole contract to supply the goods asked for". It was further 
held that: (A sale of a refrigerator is, in the absence of express 
agreement to the contrary, a sale of a normally functioning 
refrigerator. A seller who supplies a refrigerator which will 
not refrigerate is therefore in fundamental breach of his whole 
contract of sale.). 
             However, the question: Can the defendant substitute 
the refrigerator as of right?  i.e. regardless of the plaintiff's 
desire. What about   damages? Answers to these questions 
remain uncertain under Sudan law.  
 
                                                 
158 - ( 1965) S.L.J.R 
  
 
Chapter V 
Conclusion 
(a) Research Results:  
  
             This study ends up with some specific observations in 
respect of the provisions of the C.T.A 1984 governing 
"exemption" and "limitation" clauses. They are the outcome 
of examining the position of the C.T.A 1984, contrasted, 
vertically: With the position before 1974 and the position of 
the Contract Act 1974 and, horizontally: With the position of 
comparative jurisprudence, both at the statutory as well as the 
judicial levels. The following remarks and recommendations 
are set by way of conclusion:  
 
 (1) The special provisions set forth by the C.T.A. 1984 and its 
predecessor the repealed Contract Act 1974, intending to 
protect illiterate persons are no longer justifiable.  Although it 
is feasible to protect illiterate persons, it is not advisable to 
inflate that protection. It is recommended that the exception in 
favour of illiterate persons must have an effect only where the 
other party knows of its counterparty's illiteracy.  159 
 
 (2) The mechanism for policing against misuse and abuse of 
"unjust" exemption and limitation clauses as recognized by the 
C.T.A.1984 avails the courts with wide discretionary powers. 
In a system less abiding by the doctrine of stare decisis, such 
wide discretion is apt to result in lack of consistency in 
judgments and difficulty of predictability. Yardsticks similar 
to those recognized by the English Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 would considerably enhance 
consistency and bolster predictability of judicial decisions.  
 
                                                 
159 - For analysis see supra Chapter  II  
 
  (3)  Special statutory treatment has to be devoted to 
"consumer protection" as a contemporary socio-economic 
demand. 160    
 
(4)  Whereas the C.T.A 1984 approaches the question of 
breach of contract- generally- from a civil law perspective, it 
treats the question of exemption and limitation clauses from a 
common law perspective. The effect of a fundamental breach 
on the enforceability of an exemption or a limitation clause is 
obscured by this doctrinal mismatch. 161 
(5) The United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
International Sale of Goods (CISG), also referred to as, the 
Vienna Sales Convention, provides sound solutions to certain 
problem  not yet settled by Sudan law. Harmonization of the 
relevant provisions of the C.T.A 1984 with the corresponding 
provisions of the Convention is highly recommended. 162 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Appendices  
                                                 
160- For the comparative material see supra Chapter III  
161- See Chapter IV 
162 - Chapter IV        
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